WORWORLD NEWS
The
U. S.
Congress
And
American
Diplomacy
29 Dec 2020
The Nov.19 2013 issue of the World Politics "worldpolitics.com" published an article entitled "Backseat Driving: The Role of Congress in American Diplomacy" written by James M. Lindsay.
The author writes:
"Diplomacy in the American political system is frequently described as the exclusive province of presidents. Thomas Jefferson, America’s first secretary of state, wrote in 1790,
Source:
Nov. 19,
2013
by
James M.
Lindsay
Backseat
Driving:
The
Role
of
Congress
in
American
Diplomacy
The writer addresses, “The transaction of business with foreign nations is executive altogether. . . ."
"Exceptions are to be strictly construed.”
James M. Lindsay writes, "A decade later, John Marshall, who would go on to become the most influential chief justice in U.S. history, declared on the floor of the House of Representatives,
“The president is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.”
The author addresses, "Justice George Sutherland noted Marshall’s claim in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation (1936), perhaps the most frequently cited case dealing with foreign affairs, concluding that the president “alone negotiates:
Into the field of negotiation, the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.”
Source:
Nov. 19,
2013
by
James M.
Lindsay
Backseat
Driving:
The
Role
of
Congress
in
American
Diplomacy
Mr. Lindsay in his Nov 2013 article explains, "The practice of American diplomacy, however, has always been far more complicated than the words of Jefferson, Marshall and Sutherland suggest."
He writes, "The ongoing negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program offer a textbook example."
The author addresses, "As U.S. negotiators meet with their Iranian counterparts in Geneva, administration officials back in Washington lobby Congress to set aside tough new sanctions legislation that would complicate, if not kill, the talks."
"Meanwhile," writes the author, "the White House knows it must craft its offer to Tehran with an eye toward what will be acceptable to a Congress that could be asked to repeal sanctions already on the books."
Source:
Nov. 19,
2013
by
James M.
Lindsay
Backseat
Driving:
The
Role
of
Congress
in
American
Diplomacy
Thr writer continues, "And while administration officials play the inside game on Capitol Hill, they also play the outside game in the media against critics who have taken to the airwaves to argue that Iran can never be trusted."
According to the author, "The broader lesson here is that while Congress has no direct role in the conduct of diplomacy, it has ample indirect means to shape what presidents say to foreign governments or if they say anything at all."
Source:
Nov. 19,
2013
by
James M.
Lindsay
Backseat
Driving:
The
Role
of
Congress
in
American
Diplomacy
Mr. Lindsay in his writing addresses,
"The Senate can refuse to consent to treaties."
The author explains, "Congress can use its power of the purse and its power to legislate to constrain the president’s freedom of maneuver or even impose a new approach entirely."
James M. Lindsay writes, "Lawmakers can influence public opinion and thereby dissuade presidents from pursuing their favored policies."
According to the author, "And at times lawmakers may even invade the field of negotiations, Sutherland’s injunction notwithstanding."
The writer points out, "In short, while Congress takes a back seat to the president when it comes to diplomacy, it nonetheless can still have a say over the diplomatic road the United States travels."
Source:
Nov. 19,
2013
by
James M.
Lindsay
Backseat
Driving:
The
Role
of
Congress
in
American
Diplomacy
Mr. Lindsay in his writing explains,
"How effective Congress is at injecting its preferences into the diplomatic process varies with time and circumstance."
"Much of day-to-day diplomacy interests few lawmakers, and when it does they may support White House policy," the author adds.
The writer addresses, "When issues do become contentious, presidents possess considerable inherent advantages over Congress."
The author continues, "Still, these advantages can fade in the face of a unified Congress or when the success of a diplomatic initiative hinges on complementary congressional action."
"Whether congressional efforts to shape American diplomacy serve U.S. interests lies in the eye of the beholder."
The author addresses, "Where some people see short-sighted congressional efforts to hamstring a president, others see courageous attempts to prevent the White House from making moral or geopolitical blunders."
Source:
Nov. 19,
2013
by
James M.
Lindsay
Backseat
Driving:
The
Role
of
Congress
in
American
Diplomacy
The Treaty
Power
James M. Lindsay in his 19 Nov 2013 writing writes:
"The closest Congress comes to having a direct role in diplomacy is the Senate’s constitutional duty to provide advice and consent on treaties."
According to the author, "The Senate’s advice function could in theory give it significant say in treaty-making."
"But the practice of close presidential-senatorial consultations never took root."
Mr. Lindsay in his writing addresses:
"As a result, presidents have never felt obliged as a matter of constitutional principle or tradition to solicit the Senate’s advice before signing a treaty."
"Rather than seeking advice and consent, presidents have sought, as Sen. J. William Fulbright once put it, “consent without advice.”
Source:
Nov. 19,
2013
by
James M.
Lindsay
Backseat
Driving:
The
Role
of
Congress
in
American
Diplomacy
The Problems
For
Presidents
The author explains:
"The problem for presidents is that senators sometimes refuse to consent. How willing the Senate is to reject, revise or ignore treaties has varied over U.S. history as the consensus about America’s interests overseas has waxed and waned and partisan divisions have flared and subsided."
"In the second half of the 19th century ," writes the author, "the Senate refused to approve every major treaty submitted to it, leading the young Woodrow Wilson to lament that the treaty-making power had become “the treaty-marring power.”
According to James M. Lindsay,'s writing:
"By contrast, in the 1950s and 1960s senators were often “stumbling over each other to see who can say ‘yea’ the quickest and the loudest,” as one of their number described it."
Source:
Nov. 19,
2013
by
James M.
Lindsay
Backseat
Driving:
The
Role
of
Congress
in
American
Diplomacy
The author addresses, "Senatorial assertiveness resurfaced during Vietnam and escalated after the Cold War ended."
"Over the past two decades," notes the writer, "the Senate has rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, sidelined the Kyoto Protocol and forced President Barack Obama into a protracted fight to win passage of the modest New Start Treaty."
The author explains, "Presidents can bypass a reluctant Senate to an extent by signing executive agreements."
Source:
Nov. 19,
2013
by
James M.
Lindsay
Backseat
Driving:
The
Role
of
Congress
in
American
Diplomacy
The writer addresses, "These constitute a binding commitment by the United States, enjoy the same constitutional status as treaties and do not require approval of two-thirds of the Senate (and in many cases require no congressional approval at all)."
Mr. Lindsay in his writing highlights,
"These advantages help explain why executive agreements have been the preferred method for striking international deals since World War II, outnumbering treaties by more than nine-to-one."
"Nonetheless," he notes, "in many instances tradition and politics prevent the president from using executive agreements to negate the Senate’s treaty power."
Source:
Nov. 19,
2013
by
James M.
Lindsay
Backseat
Driving:
The
Role
of
Congress
in
American
Diplomacy
James M. Lindsay explains, "The Senate’s ability to constrain or block presidential treaty making does not, however, equal an ability to compel successful negotiations."
The author addresses, "The president alone controls whether negotiations begin and what is offered."
The writer adds, "At the same time, the Senate has no say over when a treaty is invoked or terminated."
Mr. Lindsay in his writing explains,
"George Washington established with his refusal to side with France in 1793 in its war with Britain that presidents decide when the conditional obligations imposed by a treaty are activated."
"And when Jimmy Carter unilate rally terminated the U.S. defense treaty with Taiwan in 1978," writes the author, "the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the claim that the treaty could be terminated only with the Senate’s consent."
Source:
Nov. 19,
2013
by
James M.
Lindsay
Backseat
Driving:
The
Role
of
Congress
in
American
Diplomacy
Appropriating
And
Legislating
James M. Lindsay addresses:
"Congress’ constitutional authority to appropriate and legislate as it sees fit is well-established and expansive."
"This power in turn," writes the author, "gives lawmakers a tool to influence diplomacy indirectly."
The author explains, "If a diplomatic initiative can be undone by congressional inaction, or if congressional action can impede it, Congress may write a different diplomatic course than the president would prefer."
Source:
Nov. 19,
2013
by
James M.
Lindsay
Backseat
Driving:
The
Role
of
Congress
in
American
Diplomacy
James M. Lindsay addresses, "with treaties, Congress’ willingness to use its lawmaking authority to impose its diplomatic preferences or block the president’s has waxed and waned over time."
The author writes, "It has risen in recent years, driven by the persistence of divided government and an eroding foreign policy consensus."
The writer explains:
"Appropriations bills, particularly those dealing with foreign assistance programs, come freighted with directions that greatly restrict the administration’s discretion in how funds might be used."
The writer adds, "Congress has similarly passed laws imposing sanctions on rogue states like Cuba and Iran and penalizing Russian officials involved in the death of whistleblower Sergei Magnitsky."
Source:
Nov. 19,
2013
by
James M.
Lindsay
Backseat
Driving:
The
Role
of
Congress
in
American
Diplomacy
James M. Lindsay addresses, "Congress’ ability to shape diplomacy through lawmaking is greatest when presidents need its cooperation."
The author explains:
"If a diplomatic initiative requires appropriations, the passage of enabling legislation or the repeal of laws already on the books, presidents have reason to adjust their policies to accommodate congressional preferences."
"Congress may also get leverage by holding unrelated legislation hostage."
Mr. Lindsay addresses:
"In 2009, for example, Sen. Jim DeMint blocked the nomination of the U.S. ambassador to Brazil until the Obama administration altered its policy toward Honduras."
The author explains, "Whether the battle is waged over the issue itself or something else, congressional opponents use to their advantage the fact that legislation must overcome many hurdles before becoming law."
"In short, if presidents want something from Congress, they may have to give something as well."
Source:
Nov. 19,
2013
by
James M.
Lindsay
Backseat
Driving:
The
Role
of
Congress
in
American
Diplomacy
***********
Pусский Oккупант:
************
Russia's Invasion
And
Occupation
Troops
In
Karabakh of
Azerbaijan
29 Dec 2020
Russian Presiden Vladimir Putin and his foreign minister Sergey Lovrov and his defense minister Sergei Shoigu all talk about "piece" instead of "peace."
There is a huge difference between their "piece" and the "peace" for life and firiendship.
Russia feels itself as the old colonial power as it was in the 18th centry with its generals like Paskevich and Yermelov. (Russia is wrong!)
Russia has a strong desire to violate the integrity of other countries like Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldavsla and Ukraine by occupying of some parts of those countries.
Russia has a strong desire to create many "pieces" from the different parts of those countries it occupies and Russia wants to make them the Russian colonies."
Russia wants the Nagono Karabakh of Azerbaijan as its colony, Abkhasia and Ossetia of Georgia as its colony, the parts of Moldova as its colony and the Crimea and Donbas of Ukraine as its colony.
On October 20, 2020 the Carnegie Endowment's website "carnegieendowment.org" published an article entitled "Russia’s Stony Path in the South Caucasus" written by Philip Remler.
Source:
Oct. 20,
2020
(Philip
Remler)
Russia’s
Stony
Path
in
the
South
Caucasus
Philip Remler writes:
"Russia sees a strategic aim in keeping Azerbaijan out of what it calls the Western camp. Therefore, while supporting Armenia, Russia has tried to avoid alienating Azerbaijan, including during the recent surge in fighting."
The author address:
"Russia has been keen to ensure that the new nations forged out of former Soviet republics remain in its camp and has formed multinational institutions to cement those relations."
The author addresses, "Russia’s closest relationship in the South Caucasus remains with Armenia, the country most firmly entrenched in Russia’s camp. It is frequently called a strategic alliance, and for Armenia this is certainly the case as 3,000 Russian troops based in its second-largest city, Gyumri, form a trip wire against Turkish military action."15*
*15 Armen Ayvazyan, Коллапс или Рестарт: Концептуaльные Аспекты Российско-Армянского Союза [Collapse or Restart: The Conceptual Aspects of the Russian-Armenian Strategic Alliance] (2018), 14–33.
Philip Remler addresses:
The Azerbaijani elites, russified by the oil boom of the late nineteenth century, have largely been friendly to Russia."
The author adds:
"Thanks to former president Heydar Aliyev—who rose through the ranks of the Soviet KGB and neither feared nor hated the post-Soviet rulers of Russia—a generally positive attitude toward Russia survived the nationalisms of the years immediately following the Soviet collapse."
Mr. Remler writes:
"The Collective Security Treaty, originally signed in 1992, became the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 2002, designed as a counterweight to NATO."
The author adds, "Armenia joined to relieve its security concerns with regard to Turkey; Azerbaijan and Georgia did not."
The writer notes, "Russia remains a supplier of weaponry to both sides, and every major arms sale to one provokes protests from the other."
Mr. Remel explains, "Because Azerbaijan’s oil revenues expanded, it has been able to diversify its defense procurements, but Armenia remains dependent on Russia for arms and security guarantees."
The writer notes, "Azerbaijan was able to avoid joining Russia’s so-called camp thanks to its independent oil revenues, which have grown for both Azerbaijan and other post-Soviet Caspian littoral states."
Mr. Remler explains, "In the early 1990s, Moscow’s ability to project power was low and Russia could only protest ineffectually when littoral countries signed hydrocarbon extraction contracts in the absence of an international agreement to define national rights in the Caspian."13*
*13 “The New Great Game in Asia,” New York Times, January 2, 1996, https://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/02/opinion/the-new-great-game-in-asia.html.
Source:
Oct. 20,
2020
(Philip
Remler)
Russia’s
Stony
Path
in
the
South
Caucasus
Philip Remler writes:
"It took a decade for Moscow to reassert its so-called power vertical in the Caucasus, symbolized by President Vladimir Putin’s success in 2004 in finally ousting chief of the general staff Anatoliy Kvashnin."3*
*3 C.J. Chivers, “Putin Dismisses 4 Senior Military Officers,” New York Times, July 19, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/19/international/europe/putin-dismisses-4-senior-military-officers.html.
The author points out:
"Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012 came with a more assertive foreign policy."
The author adds, "New leaders wholly dependent on Russia were installed in the separatist entities Russia supported, including South Ossetia and Abkhazia, replacing long-established leaders who were pro-Russian but possessed their own independent power bases."
The writer continues, "More importantly, Russia began to treat the European Union—not just NATO—as a strategic rival intent on taking over parts of what Medvedev had called Russia’s Medvedev had called Russia’s sphere of “privileged interest".
In 1996 Sergey Lovrov (his original name is Sergey Kalantarian) as the permanent reptesentaive of the Russian Federation talked about "The Russian View of Peacekeeping: International Activity for Peace".
The
Russian
View
of
Peacekeeping:
International
Activity
for
Peace
Sergey Lavrov:
"The Russian View of Peacekeeping: International Activity for Peace"
The Brown Journal of World Affairs
Vol. 3, No. 1 (Winter/Spring 1996), pp. 23-33 (11 pages)
Published By: Brown Journal of World Affairs, Winter/Spring 1996,Volume III, Issue 1
https://www.jstor.org/stable/24590391
Sergey Lovrov was talking about the peacekeeping mission while Mr. Lpvrov's Russia used earler (1988-1993) its armenian subjects to make a proxy war against Azerbaijan and by so doing, the imperialist Russia and its armeninans occupied more than 20 percent of the territories of Azerbaijan.
If the democratic countries in the world do not present themselves as the peacekeepers, the Russian troops will act as an occupying army in those regions require the peacekeeping forces from the United Nations.
Russia has the chronic addiction for aggression and occupying the territories of other countries especiaaly in the proxy war ways.
Who can deny the Khojali Genocide in the Azerbajani city Khojali (26 February 1992)? When the Russian infantry 366 participated (together with the armenian armed forces) in slaughtering of many Azerbaijani children, women and men?
On January 22, 2020, the website "carnegieendoement.org" published an article entitled "Law, Sovereignty, and Legitimacy" written by Philip Remler.
Source:
Law, Sovereignty, and Legitimacy
Philip Remler writes (summary) writes:
"Putin’s foreign policy goal has been Russia’s return as a world power."
The author writes:
"The UN is a positive platform for this, but Russia’s rejection of external norms has paralyzed the institution."
The writer explains:
"The central task for Russian foreign policy in the era of President Vladimir Putin has been to regain recognition that Russia is a world power like the Soviet Union before it. The United Nations (UN) is a positive platform for this aspiration, as Russia, with its UN Security Council (UNSC) veto power, is a privileged member of what it sees as a concert of world powers."
Philip Remler writes:
"The concept of a multipolar oligarchy leads to the Russian concept that true sovereignty is possessed by only a few great powers; the sovereignty of states it views as dependent on great powers is limited."
The author explains:
"The territory of true sovereigns and those states under Russian protection is sacrosanct and can be defended by force; for the others, it is impermissible to regain territory that is “in dispute” by force."
Mr. Remler adds:
"As an example of the former, consider the lengths to which Russia has gone to protect Syria’s use of armed force against its own population, whereas the sovereignty of former Soviet states such as Azerbaijan, Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine must be negotiated."
The author explains, "Russia’s defense of Syria demonstrates another concept that flows from sovereignty: legitimacy."
Remler notes:
"In Russian practice, the legitimacy of recognized governments is absolute regardless of their origins, governance, human rights record, or any other external norm."
The author writes, "This concept echoes Russian domestic preoccupations in the era of color revolutions, the Arab Spring, and domestic unrest."
Mr. Philip Remler explains:
"In speech after speech, both Putin and Lavrov have stressed the importance of upholding international law."
The author addresses:
"Lavrov often contrasts this law with an alternative that he maintains the West is promoting to expand Western interests and values;
In a 2018 address, for example, he charged:
“Today we can trace a tendency to substitute for international law, as we all know it, some kind of ‘rules-based order.’ That is what a series of our creative Western friends call it.”2*
2* Sergey Lavrov, speech at the Mediterranean Dialogues (in Russian), Russian Council on International Affairs, November 23, 2018, https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/comments/vystuplenie-na-konferentsii-sredizemnomore-rimskiy-dialog/?sphrase_id=31559967
Philip Remler writes:
"Lavrov does not define international law either, except to say that it is “as we all know it.”"
The writer notes, "Much research has been done in recent years on Russian approaches to international law.4*
4* See, for example, Lauri Mälksoo, Russian Approaches to International Law(Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online, 2015). Despite a polemic tone, Mälksoo’s book provides important information and analysis. A considerable portion of the book by Anthea Roberts, Is International Law International(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), is devoted to specific case studies comparing, in particular, Russian and Chinese approaches.
Mr. Remler explains:
"While the “Westernizers” who introduced the study of international law to Russia in the nineteenth century emphasized commonalty with their contemporary European schools of thought."5*
5* Russian thinkers, especially in the nineteenth century, were conventionally divided into two schools of thought: the “Westernizers” ho viewed Russia through a European perspective and the “Pan-Slavists” who viewed Russia as a separate, non-European, civilization.
On November 23, 2020, the Middle East Monitor "middleeastmonitor.com" pyblished a report entitled "Putin says Nagorno-Karabakh is inseparable territory of Azerbaijan".
Source:
November 23,
2020:
Putin
says
Nagorno-
Karabakh
is
inseparable
territory
of
Azerbaijan
The Middle East Monitor writes:
"Russian President Vladimir Putin has acknowledged that the region of Nagorno-Karabakh is internationally-recognised as belonging to Azerbaijan, two weeks after Armenia surrendered the region following its defeat to Azeri forces."
"Speaking on the Russian channel Rossiya 1 TV yesterday," writes the Middle East Monitor, "Putin reasoned that Yerevan's refusal to recognise the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh during its occupation of the province proved that it was an inseparable part of Azerbaijani territory."
Source:
November 23,
2020:
Putin
says
Nagorno-
Karabakh
is
inseparable
territory
of
Azerbaijan
On November 20, 2020, the Washington Post "washingtonpost.com" published a news report entitled "In Nagorno-Karabakh peace deal, Russia’s Putin claims a strategic win. But risks are attached" written by Robyn Dixon.
Source:
November 20,
2020:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
peace
deal,
Russia’s
Putin
claims
a
strategic
win.
But
risks
are
attached
Robyn Dixon writes:
"The Russian military presence reinforces the Kremlin’s view that its sphere of influence includes Azerbaijan and Armenia, both former Soviet countries."
Dixon adds, "It also is another counterweight to geopolitical rival, Turkey, a close Azerbaijan ally and key customer for its Caspian Sea oil and gas."
The author addresses, " Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh war proved decisive, but Putin managed to block Turkey’s ambitions to send its own peacekeepers to Nagorno-Karabakh."
"Turkey will instead send peacekeepers to Azerbaijan to take part in a monitoring center jointly with Russia."
Source:
November 20,
2020:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
peace
deal,
Russia’s
Putin
claims
a
strategic
win.
But
risks
are
attached
Robyn Dixon notes, "What Russia did was codify victories on the ground,” said Michael McFaul, director of Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies."
The author quotes Michael McFaul, director of Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies as saying:
“Whether you like it or not, this agreement is a real diplomatic victory for Vladimir Putin and allows him to play the role of peacemaker.”
"It’s the reassertion of what Putin and the folks around him have dreamed about for 20 years of being the regional hegemon," adds McFaul.
Michael McFaul continues:
The writer talks about Laurence Broers, expert on the Caucasus region at London-based think tank Chatham House, who is referring to Putin’s sparse nine-point agreement."
Source:
November 20,
2020:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
peace
deal,
Russia’s
Putin
claims
a
strategic
win.
But
risks
are
attached
Laurence Broers addressez:
"The issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, the original issue that is contested between the sides, isn’t even mentioned in the document."
Broers adds:
"So it’s not really a basis for a long-term resolution of the conflict."
"It’s more like a kind of holding pattern.”
Robyn Dixon explains:
"Nagorno-Karabakh’s security relies solely on the presence of Russian peacekeepers, but remains precarious since Azerbaijan can veto their presence after five years." (Armenia also has a veto right.)
Source:
November 20,
2020:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
peace
deal,
Russia’s
Putin
claims
a
strategic
win.
But
risks
are
attached
Mr. Dixon writes:
"Russian state TV conveyed the message that its peacekeepers were heroically coming to the rescue of Karabakh’s ethnic Armenians."
The author notes:
"But it also sent a chilling message about Armenia’s Velvet Revolution of 2018, which propelled Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to power."
"Pashinyan removed several pro-Moscow security chiefs," writes the author, "and tried to balance Russia’s influence by fostering closer ties with Europe."
Source:
November 20,
2020:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
peace
deal,
Russia’s
Putin
claims
a
strategic
win.
But
risks
are
attached
Russian President Vladimir V. Putin confess repeatedly that the Nagorno Karabakh territory [according to the international law and based on the documents exist in the United Nations] is the inseparable Azerbaijani territory."
Russia never keeps its words. Vladimir Putin between Sept 27, 2020 to Nov. 9, 2020 the appropriate time for the intervention of his Russian troops in the Nagorno Karabakh region of Azerbaijan.
Vladimir Putin, Sergei Lovrov and the defense minister Sergei Shoigo evaluated how to fish more colonial benefits from the war in the Azetbaijani territory.
The strstegic interst of the imperial and colonial Russia was determined on Nov 9, 2020.
Putin, Lovrov and Shoigo wanted to implement their long time planned blueprint for sending of the Russian troops to the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan.
Vladimir Putin, after threatening of the president of Azerbaijan and giving an ultimatum, decided to demonstrate the seriousness of his ultimatum to Azerbaijan. He ordered to his military officers to fire several Russian rockets to the capital of Azerbain.
Vladimir Putin forced the Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to accept the Russian decision for the occupation of Karabakh by the Russian troops.
Vladimir Putin himself together with his foreign minister Sergei Lovrov (his real name Sergei Kalantarian and he is ethnucally an Armenian) and the defence minister Sergei Shoygo send the Russian troops with the fake title of "The Russian Peacekeeping Troops" to occupy the region of Karabakh in Azerbaijan!!!
Lovrov
Plan
Raped
United Nations
Four
Resolutions
"Giving an Ultimatum to Azerbaijan on 9 Nov 2020 (at night) and then targeting the capital of Azerbaijan with millions of people when they are at homes (at night) by several Russia rockets and artilleries were the integral part of the Lovrov Plan signed by Vladimir Putin.
Is sending the Russian rockets and artilleries the Lovrov's plan to threaten the Azerbaijani government to accept the occupation of the Azerbaijani Karabakh by the Russian troops under the fake title of the peacekeeping forces?
The Four resolutions of the United Nations (4 decisions) meant the full withdrawal of the Armenian troops from Karabakh and the 7 surrounding regions.
The 4 resolutions of the United Nations didn't mean the real occupant of Karabakh of Azrebaijan to change its mask of wars and enters as the peacekeeping troops (Russian peacekeeping troops!!!)
Russia never wants "PEACE", rather wants to piece the countries into "PIECES".
Russia settled the Armenians gron the Ottoman Empire and Iran and settled in the Soth Caucasus and then created Armenia in the territory of Azerbaijan since 1828 until today.
Russia is the real colonial power.
Russia always has delivered many wapons to Armenia (free). Russia has trained the Armenian soldiers.
Billions of dollars of the sophisticated weapons and the military technologies havw been delivered to Armenia ( mostly very cheap or free). For example:
The Iskandar missiles, the SS-300 defense system and etc.
Russia delivers all these weapons very cheap or free to a very poor country like Armenia (free!) to make this country? Why?
To fight the Russian proxy wars against Azerbaijan.
Russia, illegally, has occupied Karabakh (since 10 Nov 2020) and plays the role of the peakeepers in the occupied Azerbaijani Karabakh.
Russia is self the occupant in Karabakh.
The Lovrov Plan is a plan for raping. It is a plan for raping of the 4 resolutions of the United Nations to witdrawal of the occupying troops from the Azerbaijani Karabakh.
The illegal deployment of the Russian troops to the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan to occupy this region again but this time by Russia itself not its armenian subjects. The aim of Russia is to make the future tensions and wars possible.
The occupstion of the Karabakh was planned earlier by Sergei Kalantarian (Sergei Lovrov whose father Viktor was an Armenian). This plan has a name: "THE LOVROV'S PLAN".
On OCT 07, 2020, the Turkish news agency Daily Sabah "dailysabah.com" published a news entitled "Russia does not haveobligation to defend Armenia in a war outside its territories, Putin says"
Source:
Russia
does
not
have
obligation
to
defend
Armenia
in
a
war
outside
its
territories,
Putin
says
The Daily Sabah reports:
"Russia does not have an obligation to defend Armenia, as its conflict with Azerbaijan is not being waged in Armenian territory, Russian President Vladimir Putin said Wednesday."
"Speaking in an interview with the Russian public broadcaster," writes the Daily Sabah, "Putin also reiterated his call for a cease-fire, adding that the events were a tragedy and that Moscow was none-the-less deeply concerned."
Source:
Russia
does
not
have
obligation
to
defend
Armenia
in
a
war
outside
its
territories,
Putin
says
Link:
November 12,
2020
(Michael
Young)
:Playing
Great
Games
in
the
South
Caucasus
Russia occupies the region of Karabakh in Azerbaijan and also occupies Abkhazia and South Ossetia of the Republic Georgia, all regions are in the South Caucasus.
Russia
Occupies
Trans-Dniester
In
Moldova
Russia occupies a region in Moldova and Moldova's new president Maia Sandu has called for the withdrawal of Russian troops from a breakaway region at the border with Ukraine.
In her first news conference as president-elect, Ms Sandu said Russian forces never had permission to be in the separatist area of Trans-Dniester.
The Kremlin has rejected her comments, saying the move could be destabilising.
Source:
30 November
2020 (BBC):
Moldova's
new
president
calls
for
Russian
troops
to
withdraw
from
territory
Ms Sandu defeated incumbent president Igor Dodon, who was openly backed by Russia, in a vote earlier this month.
Responding to Ms Sandu's comments, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters in Moscow that Russia expected the authorities stationed in Trans-Dniester to remain in place.
"Russia performs a very important function," he said, adding that any change "could lead to serious destabilisation" in the region.
The separatist region of Trans-Dniester - a narrow strip of land between the Dniester river and the Ukrainian border whose main city is Tiraspol - broke away from Moldova after a brief war in 1992.
The 48-year-old is a former World Bank economist who favours closer ties with the European Union.
On Monday, she said Russia's peacekeeping force - the Operational Group of Russian Forces in Trans-Dniester (OGRF) - should be replaced in the Moldovan territory by civilian monitors under the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
"We are an independent country that does not want foreign troops to stay on its territory," she told reporters in the Moldovan capital, Chisinau.
"This is not just a declaration - this is a necessity," she added, stating that she would "work with Russia for as long as it takes to solve the issue of the arms re
Moldova regards the OGRF as the descendants of the Russian forces that sided with Russian-speaking separatists after the break-up of the Soviet Union.
Russia has about 1,500 troops stationed in the region.
The United Nations has backed a number of resolutions calling on Russian troops to withdraw "unconditionally" from the territory, along with the weapons stockpile they are guarding there.
Responding to Ms Sandu's comments, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters in Moscow that Russia expected the authorities stationed in Trans-Dniester to remain in place.
"Russia performs a very important function," he said, adding that any change "could lead to serious destabilisation" in the region.
The separatist region of Trans-Dniester - a narrow strip of land between the Dniester river and the Ukrainian border whose main city is Tiraspol - broke away from Moldova after a brief war in 1992.
The international community does not recognise its self-declared statehood, and the de-facto government, which remains in a tense stand-off with Moldova, is economically, politically and militarily supported by Russia.
Ms Sandu, a former prime minister of Moldova, scored an emphatic victory against Mr Dodon, who Russian President Vladimir Putin had openly supported in Moldova's presidential election, in a run-off ballot on 15 November.
She has said that as president she would make it her priority to tackle corruption and unite the country. Ms Sandu is due to be sworn in as president in the coming weeks.
Source:
30 November
2020 (BBC):
Moldova's
new
president
calls
for
Russian
troops
to
withdraw
from
territory
On Jan 22, 2019, CNBC "cnbc.com" published a report entitled "Russia is still occupying 20% of our country, Georgia's prime minister says" written by Holly Ellyatt.
Source:
Russia
is
still
occupying
20%
of
our
country,
Georgia's
prime
minister
says
Holly Ellyatt writes:
"Russia's territorial conflict with Ukraine has grabbed much more media attention in recent years but the country's presence in, and support of, breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia continues to plague the Georgia."
"Unfortunately, Russia continues to occupy 20 percent of our territory," Prime Minister Mamuka Bakhtadze told CNBC."
The author addresses:
"Russia's annexation of Crimea from Ukraine and its role in a pro-Russian uprising in 2014 caused international uproar and sanctions to be placed on Russia, but it wasn't the first time that Russia has supported uprisings in neighboring ex-Soviet republics."
The writer explains, "In 2008, Russia supported the self-proclaimed republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (disputed regions since the break up of the Soviet Union) prompting a short-lived, five-day war between Russia and Georgia that resulted in a Russian-led military victory."
Source:
Russia
is
still
occupying
20%
of
our
country,
Georgia's
prime
minister
says
On Nov 17, 2020, the Euroasia Net "eurasianet.org" published an article in the website of entitled "Perspectives | Did Russia win the Karabakh war?" written by Laurence Broers.
Source:
Perspectives | Did Russia win the Karabakh war?
Laurence Broers addresses:
"Moscow added Azerbaijan to the list of states where it has boots on the ground in the South Caucasus, shut out the West, put Turkey in its place and made plain that it remains the dominant."
The October issue of Irish Times (Updated: Fri, Oct 16, 2020) published its report about Karabakh entitled "Azerbaijan rejects Russian call for peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh" written by Daniel McLaughlin.
Source:
Azerbaijan
rejects
Russian
call
for
peacekeepers
in
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Daniel McLaughlin writes:
"Azerbaijan has rejected a Russian suggestion to send peacekeepers or military observers to Nagorno-Karabakh and insisted that its conflict with Armenia over the disputed region can only be resolved with the involvement of Turkey."
The author addresses, "Hundreds of people have been killed in renewed fighting in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, a region of Azerbaijan that has been run by its ethnic Armenian majority since a war in the 1990s that claimed about 30,000."
On Dec. 1, 2020 (Updated Dec. 15, 2020), the New York Times published an article entitled "In Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Deal, Putin Applied a Deft New
Touch" written by Anton Troianovski and Carlotta Gall.
Source:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Peace
Deal,
Putin
Applied
a
Deft
New
Touch
Anton Troianovski and Carlotta Gall write in the New York Times the following words:
"The strategy seems to have paid immediate dividends, providing the Kremlin with a military foothold in the region and welding Armenia firmly into Russia’s sphere of influence, without alienating Azerbaijan."
The authors write:
"With Russian support, Armenia had won control of Nagorno-Karabakh, a region of Azerbaijan inhabited by ethnic Armenians, after a yearslong war in the early 1990s that was precipitated by the breakup of the Soviet Union."
"Armenian forces also captured surrounding districts, expelling more than half a million Azerbaijanis."
Source:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Peace
Deal,
Putin
Applied
a
Deft
New
Touch
On November 20, 2020, the Washington Post "washingtonpost.com" published a news report entitled "In Nagorno-Karabakh peace deal, Russia’s Putin claims a strategic win. But risks are attached" written by Robyn Dixon.
Source:
November 20,
2020:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
peace
deal,
Russia’s
Putin
claims
a
strategic
win.
But
risks
are
attached
Anton Troianovski and Carlotta Gall
in their writing in New York Times address:
"In early November, Azerbaijani troops wrested the mountaintop citadel of Shusha from Armenian control, scaling the wooded slopes and fighting hand-to-hand in close combat through the streets."
The writers explain:
"By Nov. 9, they were pummeling Armenian soldiers along the road to nearby Stepanakert, home to a peacetime population of some 50,000 ethnic Armenians, and an even bigger battle appeared imminent."
Source:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Peace
Deal,
Putin
Applied
a
Deft
New
Touch
Troianovski and Gall write:
"Then Mr. Putin, who earlier had tried to broker a cease-fire, stepped in."
"Azerbaijan that night accidentally shot down a Russian helicopter, potentially giving Moscow a reason to intervene."
Source:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Peace
Deal,
Putin
Applied
a
Deft
New
Touch
PUTIN'S
ULTIMTUM
TO
AZERBAIJAN
The authors write:
The Russian president delivered an ultimatum to Mr. Aliyev of Azerbaijan, according to several people briefed on the matter in the country’s capital, Baku:
"If Azerbaijan did not cease its operations after capturing Shusha, the Russian military would intervene."
The authors explain:
"The same night, a missile of unknown provenance hit an open area in Baku, without causing any injuries, according to Azerbaijani sources.
Some suspected it was a signal from Russia that it was prepared to get involved and had the capacity to inflict significant damage."
The authors address:
"Hours later, Mr. Putin announced a peace deal, and Mr. Aliyev went on television to announce that all military operations would stop."
Anton Troianovski and Carlotta Gall write:
"Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan of Armenia said he had no choice but to go along, facing the prospect of even more bloodshed on the battlefield."
Source:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Peace
Deal,
Putin
Applied
a
Deft
New
Touch
Putin's
Victory?
Troanovski and Gall address:
"Mr. Aliyev cast the deal as a victory, with all but a sliver of what was Armenian-controlled territory in Nagorno-Karabakh being returned to Azerbaijan."
The authors write:
But he, too, had to compromise: Nearly 2,000 Russian troops, operating as peacekeepers, would now be stationed on Azerbaijani territory."
Source:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Peace
Deal,
Putin
Applied
a
Deft
New
Touch
The writers address:
"It was a strategic boon for Russia, giving Moscow a military foothold just north of Iran, but also a risk because it put Russian troops in the middle of one of the world’s most intractable ethnic coflicts."
The authors quote Azad Isazade, who served in Azerbaijan’s Defense Ministry during the 1990s as saying:
"I don’t know how it will end this time, because there is no good example of Russian peacekeepers in the Caucasus.”
"I am worried how it will end," adds Isadzade.
Source:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Peace
Deal,
Putin
Applied
a
Deft
New
Touch
Anton Troianovsky and Carotta Gall write:
"Seared in almost every Azerbaijani’s memory are the bloody events of 1990, when Soviet tanks rolled over demonstrators in Baku’s central square."
"Russian troops have since intervened repeatedly in troubled corners of the Caucasus, often under the moniker of peacekeepers but acting more like an invading army."
Source:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Peace
Deal,
Putin
Applied
a
Deft
New
Touch
WHY
STATUS
TO
ARMENIANS?
Are the Armenians who are living in the Glendale region of Los Angeles in California enjoying for having a political status and a kind of independency from the USA?
Are the districts in Paris, Moscow, Isfahan where the Armenians are residing enjoying the political status?
Why the Western countries and Russian insist to give the political status to the Armenians living in a region of Azerbaijan called Nagorno-Karabakh?
Why not giving a political status to the Armenians living in the Azerbaijani Karabakh is a blow to the self-governing institutions but not for the Armenians living in France, Russuia, USA? Why?
Why not giving the political status and the independency to the Armenians in the Azerbaijani Karabakh creates
uncertainties and insecurities for its Armenian population but not to the Armenians living in France, Syria,Iran, USA, Russia, Canada?
Russia's
Passports
In
The
Occupied
Territories
30 Dec 2020
On 13 November 2020, the website "112.international" published a report entitled "Russia speeds up forceful issuance of passports in Donbas, - Ukraine's military intel".
The information in the website "112.international" addresses:
"Russia speeds up forceful issuance of passports in Donbas, - Ukraine's military intel."
"Besides, the Russian side recruits men with Russian citizenship who reside in Donbas for service in the ranks of peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh."
According to this information in the website "112.international":
"Russian passport, i.e. citizenship is the obligatory condition for citizens to serve in the units of the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the occupant troops."
The website's information addresses:
"Russian military command pays special attention to the process of issuance of passports to the recruited servicemen."
Source:
Russia
speeds
up
forceful
issuance
of
passports
in Donbas,
-
Ukraine's
military
intel
"Besides, the Russian side recruits men with Russian citizenship who reside in Donbas for service in the ranks of peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh."
Russian occupant forces continue to hasten forceful issuance of passports for residents of the occupied Donbas. Press office of the Chief Intelligence Department of Ukraine's Defense Ministry "reported that on November 13, 2020.
The website "112.international" addresses:
"Russian passport, i.e. citizenship is the obligatory condition for citizens to serve in the units of the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the occupant troops."
The website's information says:
"Russian military command pays special attention to the process of issuance of passports to the recruited servicemen."
According to the informstion of the website "112.international":
"Besides, the Ukrainian intelligence reported that Russian side recruits men with Russian citizenship who reside in Donbas for service in the ranks of peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh."
The website "112.international" informs:
"The occupants also consider cutting civilian rights for people holding the passport of Ukraine."
The website's infornation explains:
"The changes may include status of "foreign citizen", disapproval of electoral right and the opportunity to make civilian and legal deals, which require notary certification."
On 22 June 2019 Holly Elyatt writes:
"In 2008, Russia supported the self-proclaimed republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (disputed regions since the break up of the Soviet Union) prompting a short-lived, five-day war between Russia and Georgia that resulted in a Russian-led military victory."
Source:
Russia
is
still
occupying
20%
of
our
country,
Georgia's
prime
minister
says
On October 20, 2020 the Carnegie Endowment's website "carnegieendowment.org" published an article entitled "Russia’s Stony Path in the South Caucasus" written by Philip Remler.
Source:
Oct. 20,
2020
(Philip
Remler)
Russia’s
Stony
Path
in
the
South
Caucasus
Philip Remler writes:
"Russian president Boris Yeltsin called Shevardnadze in November 1999 to demand the reinstatement of Russian border troops in Georgia and passage for Russian military units through Georgia to attack Pankisi from the south."
The author adds, "Shevardnadze stalled and then called on the Americans to dissuade Yeltsin."
The author addresses, "Later, after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States sent troops to train the Georgians to restore security in Pankisi, forestalling Russian actions there."
Mr. Remler writes:
"Even worse, from the Russian point of view, Shevardnadze made a deal with Ruslan Gelayev, a Chechen commander sheltering in the Pankisi Gorge, to launch an attack on Abkhaz-held territory in 2001."
"The attack failed, but the Russian authorities viewed this series of events as proof that Georgia was treacherous and untrustworthy."
Philip Remel writes, "With Russian facilitation, many so-called volunteers made their way to Abkhazia to join the separatist war against Georgia from 1992 to 1993."
"Among the most effective of these was the Chechen Shamil Basayev, who was later an archnemesis of the Russians but their ally in that struggle."11*
*11 “Georgia/Abkhazia: Violations of the Laws of War and Russia’s Role in the Conflict,” Human Rights Watch, March 1995, https://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Georgia2.htm.
Source:
Oct. 20,
2020
(Philip
Remler)
Russia’s
Stony
Path
in
the
South
Caucasus
The author writes:
"Since brokering a ceasefire in the Karabakh conflict in 1994, Moscow has limited its interventions to trying (unsuccessfully) to get the sides to agree to a Russia-led peacekeeping force of the sort Moscow installed to control the Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdniestria separatist conflicts."
Philip Remler addresses:
"Despite initial nationalist difficulties in Borchaly, an Azerbaijani-inhabited section of Georgia, Georgian-Azerbaijani relations have been good almost since Georgia’s independence—largely thanks to a reconciliation of convenience between two Soviet-era rivals, Eduard Shevardnadze and Heydar Aliyev."
The author addresses, "Georgian-Armenian relations have been trickier. A portion of the Armenian population in Georgia is concentrated in Javakheti, near a large Soviet (later Russian) military base that fueled the region’s economy until it was closed in 2007. From 1992 to 1993, the Javakhk Armenians sought independence, apparently with Russian encouragement."
The writer addresses, "When issues do become contentious, presidents possess considerable inherent advantages over Congress."
The author continues, "Still, these advantages can fade in the face of a unified Congress or when the success of a diplomatic initiative hinges on complementary congressional action."
"Whether congressional efforts to shape American diplomacy serve U.S. interests lies in the eye of the beholder."
The author addresses, "Where some people see short-sighted congressional efforts to hamstring a president, others see courageous attempts to prevent the White House from making moral or geopolitical blunders."
Source:
Nov. 19,
2013
by
James M.
Lindsay
Backseat
Driving:
The
Role
of
Congress
in
American
Diplomacy
James M. Lindsay in his 19 Nov 2013 writing writes:
"The closest Congress comes to having a direct role in diplomacy is the Senate’s constitutional duty to provide advice and consent on treaties."
According to the author, "The Senate’s advice function could in theory give it significant say in treaty-making."
"But the practice of close presidential-senatorial consultations never took root."
Mr. Lindsay in his writing addresses:
"As a result, presidents have never felt obliged as a matter of constitutional principle or tradition to solicit the Senate’s advice before signing a treaty."
"Rather than seeking advice and consent, presidents have sought, as Sen. J. William Fulbright once put it, “consent without advice.”
Source:
Nov. 19,
2013
by
James M.
Lindsay
Backseat
Driving:
The
Role
of
Congress
in
American
Diplomacy
The author explains:
"The problem for presidents is that senators sometimes refuse to consent. How willing the Senate is to reject, revise or ignore treaties has varied over U.S. history as the consensus about America’s interests overseas has waxed and waned and partisan divisions have flared and subsided."
"In the second half of the 19th century ," writes the author, "the Senate refused to approve every major treaty submitted to it, leading the young Woodrow Wilson to lament that the treaty-making power had become “the treaty-marring power.”
According to James M. Lindsay,'s writing:
"By contrast, in the 1950s and 1960s senators were often “stumbling over each other to see who can say ‘yea’ the quickest and the loudest,” as one of their number described it."
Source:
Nov. 19,
2013
by
James M.
Lindsay
Backseat
Driving:
The
Role
of
Congress
in
American
Diplomacy
The author addresses, "Senatorial assertiveness resurfaced during Vietnam and escalated after the Cold War ended."
"Over the past two decades," notes the writer, "the Senate has rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, sidelined the Kyoto Protocol and forced President Barack Obama into a protracted fight to win passage of the modest New Start Treaty."
The author explains, "Presidents can bypass a reluctant Senate to an extent by signing executive agreements."
Source:
Nov. 19,
2013
by
James M.
Lindsay
Backseat
Driving:
The
Role
of
Congress
in
American
Diplomacy
The writer addresses, "These constitute a binding commitment by the United States, enjoy the same constitutional status as treaties and do not require approval of two-thirds of the Senate (and in many cases require no congressional approval at all)."
Mr. Lindsay in his writing highlights,
"These advantages help explain why executive agreements have been the preferred method for striking international deals since World War II, outnumbering treaties by more than nine-to-one."
"Nonetheless," he notes, "in many instances tradition and politics prevent the president from using executive agreements to negate the Senate’s treaty power."
Source:
Nov. 19,
2013
by
James M.
Lindsay
Backseat
Driving:
The
Role
of
Congress
in
American
Diplomacy
James M. Lindsay explains, "The Senate’s ability to constrain or block presidential treaty making does not, however, equal an ability to compel successful negotiations."
The author addresses, "The president alone controls whether negotiations begin and what is offered."
The writer adds, "At the same time, the Senate has no say over when a treaty is invoked or terminated."
Mr. Lindsay in his writing explains,
"George Washington established with his refusal to side with France in 1793 in its war with Britain that presidents decide when the conditional obligations imposed by a treaty are activated."
"And when Jimmy Carter unilate rally terminated the U.S. defense treaty with Taiwan in 1978," writes the author, "the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the claim that the treaty could be terminated only with the Senate’s consent."
Source:
Nov. 19,
2013
by
James M.
Lindsay
Backseat
Driving:
The
Role
of
Congress
in
American
Diplomacy
James M. Lindsay addresses:
"Congress’ constitutional authority to appropriate and legislate as it sees fit is well-established and expansive."
"This power in turn," writes the author, "gives lawmakers a tool to influence diplomacy indirectly."
The author explains, "If a diplomatic initiative can be undone by congressional inaction, or if congressional action can impede it, Congress may write a different diplomatic course than the president would prefer."
Source:
Nov. 19,
2013
by
James M.
Lindsay
Backseat
Driving:
The
Role
of
Congress
in
American
Diplomacy
James M. Lindsay addresses, "with treaties, Congress’ willingness to use its lawmaking authority to impose its diplomatic preferences or block the president’s has waxed and waned over time."
The author writes, "It has risen in recent years, driven by the persistence of divided government and an eroding foreign policy consensus."
The writer explains:
"Appropriations bills, particularly those dealing with foreign assistance programs, come freighted with directions that greatly restrict the administration’s discretion in how funds might be used."
The writer adds, "Congress has similarly passed laws imposing sanctions on rogue states like Cuba and Iran and penalizing Russian officials involved in the death of whistleblower Sergei Magnitsky."
Source:
Nov. 19,
2013
by
James M.
Lindsay
Backseat
Driving:
The
Role
of
Congress
in
American
Diplomacy
James M. Lindsay addresses, "Congress’ ability to shape diplomacy through lawmaking is greatest when presidents need its cooperation."
The author explains:
"If a diplomatic initiative requires appropriations, the passage of enabling legislation or the repeal of laws already on the books, presidents have reason to adjust their policies to accommodate congressional preferences."
"Congress may also get leverage by holding unrelated legislation hostage."
Mr. Lindsay addresses:
"In 2009, for example, Sen. Jim DeMint blocked the nomination of the U.S. ambassador to Brazil until the Obama administration altered its policy toward Honduras."
The author explains, "Whether the battle is waged over the issue itself or something else, congressional opponents use to their advantage the fact that legislation must overcome many hurdles before becoming law."
"In short, if presidents want something from Congress, they may have to give something as well."
Source:
Nov. 19,
2013
by
James M.
Lindsay
Backseat
Driving:
The
Role
of
Congress
in
American
Diplomacy
Pусский Oккупант:
Russia's Invasion
And
Occupation
Troops
In
Karabakh of
Azerbaijan
29 Dec 2020
Russian Presiden Vladimir Putin and his foreign minister Sergey Lovrov and his defense minister Sergei Shoigu all talk about "piece" instead of "peace."
There is a huge difference between their "piece" and the "peace" for life and firiendship.
Russia feels itself as the old colonial power as it was in the 18th centry with its generals like Paskevich and Yermelov. (Russia is wrong!)
Russia has a strong desire to violate the integrity of other countries like Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldavsla and Ukraine by occupying of some parts of those countries.
Russia has a strong desire to create many "pieces" from the different parts of those countries it occupies and Russia wants to make them the Russian colonies."
Russia wants the Nagono Karabakh of Azerbaijan as its colony, Abkhasia and Ossetia of Georgia as its colony, the parts of Moldova as its colony and the Crimea and Donbas of Ukraine as its colony.
On October 20, 2020 the Carnegie Endowment's website "carnegieendowment.org" published an article entitled "Russia’s Stony Path in the South Caucasus" written by Philip Remler.
Source:
Oct. 20,
2020
(Philip
Remler)
Russia’s
Stony
Path
in
the
South
Caucasus
Philip Remler writes:
"Russia sees a strategic aim in keeping Azerbaijan out of what it calls the Western camp. Therefore, while supporting Armenia, Russia has tried to avoid alienating Azerbaijan, including during the recent surge in fighting."
The author address:
"Russia has been keen to ensure that the new nations forged out of former Soviet republics remain in its camp and has formed multinational institutions to cement those relations."
The author addresses, "Russia’s closest relationship in the South Caucasus remains with Armenia, the country most firmly entrenched in Russia’s camp. It is frequently called a strategic alliance, and for Armenia this is certainly the case as 3,000 Russian troops based in its second-largest city, Gyumri, form a trip wire against Turkish military action."15*
*15 Armen Ayvazyan, Коллапс или Рестарт: Концептуaльные Аспекты Российско-Армянского Союза [Collapse or Restart: The Conceptual Aspects of the Russian-Armenian Strategic Alliance] (2018), 14–33.
Philip Remler addresses:
The Azerbaijani elites, russified by the oil boom of the late nineteenth century, have largely been friendly to Russia."
The author adds:
"Thanks to former president Heydar Aliyev—who rose through the ranks of the Soviet KGB and neither feared nor hated the post-Soviet rulers of Russia—a generally positive attitude toward Russia survived the nationalisms of the years immediately following the Soviet collapse."
Mr. Remler writes:
"The Collective Security Treaty, originally signed in 1992, became the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 2002, designed as a counterweight to NATO."
The author adds, "Armenia joined to relieve its security concerns with regard to Turkey; Azerbaijan and Georgia did not."
The writer notes, "Russia remains a supplier of weaponry to both sides, and every major arms sale to one provokes protests from the other."
Mr. Remel explains, "Because Azerbaijan’s oil revenues expanded, it has been able to diversify its defense procurements, but Armenia remains dependent on Russia for arms and security guarantees."
The writer notes, "Azerbaijan was able to avoid joining Russia’s so-called camp thanks to its independent oil revenues, which have grown for both Azerbaijan and other post-Soviet Caspian littoral states."
Mr. Remler explains, "In the early 1990s, Moscow’s ability to project power was low and Russia could only protest ineffectually when littoral countries signed hydrocarbon extraction contracts in the absence of an international agreement to define national rights in the Caspian."13*
*13 “The New Great Game in Asia,” New York Times, January 2, 1996, https://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/02/opinion/the-new-great-game-in-asia.html.
Source:
Oct. 20,
2020
(Philip
Remler)
Russia’s
Stony
Path
in
the
South
Caucasus
Philip Remler writes:
"It took a decade for Moscow to reassert its so-called power vertical in the Caucasus, symbolized by President Vladimir Putin’s success in 2004 in finally ousting chief of the general staff Anatoliy Kvashnin."3*
*3 C.J. Chivers, “Putin Dismisses 4 Senior Military Officers,” New York Times, July 19, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/19/international/europe/putin-dismisses-4-senior-military-officers.html.
The author points out:
"Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012 came with a more assertive foreign policy."
The author adds, "New leaders wholly dependent on Russia were installed in the separatist entities Russia supported, including South Ossetia and Abkhazia, replacing long-established leaders who were pro-Russian but possessed their own independent power bases."
The writer continues, "More importantly, Russia began to treat the European Union—not just NATO—as a strategic rival intent on taking over parts of what Medvedev had called Russia’s Medvedev had called Russia’s sphere of “privileged interest".
In 1996 Sergey Lovrov (his original name is Sergey Kalantarian) as the permanent reptesentaive of the Russian Federation talked about "The Russian View of Peacekeeping: International Activity for Peace".
The
Russian
View
of
Peacekeeping:
International
Activity
for
Peace
Sergey Lavrov:
"The Russian View of Peacekeeping: International Activity for Peace"
The Brown Journal of World Affairs
Vol. 3, No. 1 (Winter/Spring 1996), pp. 23-33 (11 pages)
Published By: Brown Journal of World Affairs, Winter/Spring 1996,Volume III, Issue 1
https://www.jstor.org/stable/24590391
Sergey Lovrov was talking about the peacekeeping mission while Mr. Lpvrov's Russia used earler (1988-1993) its armenian subjects to make a proxy war against Azerbaijan and by so doing, the imperialist Russia and its armeninans occupied more than 20 percent of the territories of Azerbaijan.
If the democratic countries in the world do not present themselves as the peacekeepers, the Russian troops will act as an occupying army in those regions require the peacekeeping forces from the United Nations.
Russia has the chronic addiction for aggression and occupying the territories of other countries especiaaly in the proxy war ways.
Who can deny the Khojali Genocide in the Azerbajani city Khojali (26 February 1992)? When the Russian infantry 366 participated (together with the armenian armed forces) in slaughtering of many Azerbaijani children, women and men?
On January 22, 2020, the website "carnegieendoement.org" published an article entitled "Law, Sovereignty, and Legitimacy" written by Philip Remler.
Source:
Law, Sovereignty, and Legitimacy
Philip Remler writes (summary) writes:
"Putin’s foreign policy goal has been Russia’s return as a world power."
The author writes:
"The UN is a positive platform for this, but Russia’s rejection of external norms has paralyzed the institution."
The writer explains:
"The central task for Russian foreign policy in the era of President Vladimir Putin has been to regain recognition that Russia is a world power like the Soviet Union before it. The United Nations (UN) is a positive platform for this aspiration, as Russia, with its UN Security Council (UNSC) veto power, is a privileged member of what it sees as a concert of world powers."
Philip Remler writes:
"The concept of a multipolar oligarchy leads to the Russian concept that true sovereignty is possessed by only a few great powers; the sovereignty of states it views as dependent on great powers is limited."
The author explains:
"The territory of true sovereigns and those states under Russian protection is sacrosanct and can be defended by force; for the others, it is impermissible to regain territory that is “in dispute” by force."
Mr. Remler adds:
"As an example of the former, consider the lengths to which Russia has gone to protect Syria’s use of armed force against its own population, whereas the sovereignty of former Soviet states such as Azerbaijan, Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine must be negotiated."
The author explains, "Russia’s defense of Syria demonstrates another concept that flows from sovereignty: legitimacy."
Remler notes:
"In Russian practice, the legitimacy of recognized governments is absolute regardless of their origins, governance, human rights record, or any other external norm."
The author writes, "This concept echoes Russian domestic preoccupations in the era of color revolutions, the Arab Spring, and domestic unrest."
Mr. Philip Remler explains:
"In speech after speech, both Putin and Lavrov have stressed the importance of upholding international law."
The author addresses:
"Lavrov often contrasts this law with an alternative that he maintains the West is promoting to expand Western interests and values;
In a 2018 address, for example, he charged:
“Today we can trace a tendency to substitute for international law, as we all know it, some kind of ‘rules-based order.’ That is what a series of our creative Western friends call it.”2*
2* Sergey Lavrov, speech at the Mediterranean Dialogues (in Russian), Russian Council on International Affairs, November 23, 2018, https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/comments/vystuplenie-na-konferentsii-sredizemnomore-rimskiy-dialog/?sphrase_id=31559967
Philip Remler writes:
"Lavrov does not define international law either, except to say that it is “as we all know it.”"
The writer notes, "Much research has been done in recent years on Russian approaches to international law.4*
4* See, for example, Lauri Mälksoo, Russian Approaches to International Law(Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online, 2015). Despite a polemic tone, Mälksoo’s book provides important information and analysis. A considerable portion of the book by Anthea Roberts, Is International Law International(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), is devoted to specific case studies comparing, in particular, Russian and Chinese approaches.
Mr. Remler explains:
"While the “Westernizers” who introduced the study of international law to Russia in the nineteenth century emphasized commonalty with their contemporary European schools of thought."5*
5* Russian thinkers, especially in the nineteenth century, were conventionally divided into two schools of thought: the “Westernizers” ho viewed Russia through a European perspective and the “Pan-Slavists” who viewed Russia as a separate, non-European, civilization.
On November 23, 2020, the Middle East Monitor "middleeastmonitor.com" pyblished a report entitled "Putin says Nagorno-Karabakh is inseparable territory of Azerbaijan".
Source:
November 23,
2020:
Putin
says
Nagorno-
Karabakh
is
inseparable
territory
of
Azerbaijan
The Middle East Monitor writes:
"Russian President Vladimir Putin has acknowledged that the region of Nagorno-Karabakh is internationally-recognised as belonging to Azerbaijan, two weeks after Armenia surrendered the region following its defeat to Azeri forces."
"Speaking on the Russian channel Rossiya 1 TV yesterday," writes the Middle East Monitor, "Putin reasoned that Yerevan's refusal to recognise the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh during its occupation of the province proved that it was an inseparable part of Azerbaijani territory."
Source:
November 23,
2020:
Putin
says
Nagorno-
Karabakh
is
inseparable
territory
of
Azerbaijan
On November 20, 2020, the Washington Post "washingtonpost.com" published a news report entitled "In Nagorno-Karabakh peace deal, Russia’s Putin claims a strategic win. But risks are attached" written by Robyn Dixon.
Source:
November 20,
2020:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
peace
deal,
Russia’s
Putin
claims
a
strategic
win.
But
risks
are
attached
Robyn Dixon writes:
"The Russian military presence reinforces the Kremlin’s view that its sphere of influence includes Azerbaijan and Armenia, both former Soviet countries."
Dixon adds, "It also is another counterweight to geopolitical rival, Turkey, a close Azerbaijan ally and key customer for its Caspian Sea oil and gas."
The author addresses, " Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh war proved decisive, but Putin managed to block Turkey’s ambitions to send its own peacekeepers to Nagorno-Karabakh."
"Turkey will instead send peacekeepers to Azerbaijan to take part in a monitoring center jointly with Russia."
Source:
November 20,
2020:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
peace
deal,
Russia’s
Putin
claims
a
strategic
win.
But
risks
are
attached
Robyn Dixon notes, "What Russia did was codify victories on the ground,” said Michael McFaul, director of Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies."
The author quotes Michael McFaul, director of Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies as saying:
“Whether you like it or not, this agreement is a real diplomatic victory for Vladimir Putin and allows him to play the role of peacemaker.”
"It’s the reassertion of what Putin and the folks around him have dreamed about for 20 years of being the regional hegemon," adds McFaul.
Michael McFaul continues:
The writer talks about Laurence Broers, expert on the Caucasus region at London-based think tank Chatham House, who is referring to Putin’s sparse nine-point agreement."
Source:
November 20,
2020:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
peace
deal,
Russia’s
Putin
claims
a
strategic
win.
But
risks
are
attached
Laurence Broers addressez:
"The issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, the original issue that is contested between the sides, isn’t even mentioned in the document."
Broers adds:
"So it’s not really a basis for a long-term resolution of the conflict."
"It’s more like a kind of holding pattern.”
Robyn Dixon explains:
"Nagorno-Karabakh’s security relies solely on the presence of Russian peacekeepers, but remains precarious since Azerbaijan can veto their presence after five years." (Armenia also has a veto right.)
Source:
November 20,
2020:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
peace
deal,
Russia’s
Putin
claims
a
strategic
win.
But
risks
are
attached
Mr. Dixon writes:
"Russian state TV conveyed the message that its peacekeepers were heroically coming to the rescue of Karabakh’s ethnic Armenians."
The author notes:
"But it also sent a chilling message about Armenia’s Velvet Revolution of 2018, which propelled Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to power."
"Pashinyan removed several pro-Moscow security chiefs," writes the author, "and tried to balance Russia’s influence by fostering closer ties with Europe."
Source:
November 20,
2020:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
peace
deal,
Russia’s
Putin
claims
a
strategic
win.
But
risks
are
attached
Russian President Vladimir V. Putin confess repeatedly that the Nagorno Karabakh territory [according to the international law and based on the documents exist in the United Nations] is the inseparable Azerbaijani territory."
Russia never keeps its words. Vladimir Putin between Sept 27, 2020 to Nov. 9, 2020 the appropriate time for the intervention of his Russian troops in the Nagorno Karabakh region of Azerbaijan.
Vladimir Putin, Sergei Lovrov and the defense minister Sergei Shoigo evaluated how to fish more colonial benefits from the war in the Azetbaijani territory.
The strstegic interst of the imperial and colonial Russia was determined on Nov 9, 2020.
Putin, Lovrov and Shoigo wanted to implement their long time planned blueprint for sending of the Russian troops to the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan.
Vladimir Putin, after threatening of the president of Azerbaijan and giving an ultimatum, decided to demonstrate the seriousness of his ultimatum to Azerbaijan. He ordered to his military officers to fire several Russian rockets to the capital of Azerbain.
Vladimir Putin forced the Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to accept the Russian decision for the occupation of Karabakh by the Russian troops.
Vladimir Putin himself together with his foreign minister Sergei Lovrov (his real name Sergei Kalantarian and he is ethnucally an Armenian) and the defence minister Sergei Shoygo send the Russian troops with the fake title of "The Russian Peacekeeping Troops" to occupy the region of Karabakh in Azerbaijan!!!
Lovrov
Plan
Raped
United Nations
Four
Resolutions
"Giving an Ultimatum to Azerbaijan on 9 Nov 2020 (at night) and then targeting the capital of Azerbaijan with millions of people when they are at homes (at night) by several Russia rockets and artilleries were the integral part of the Lovrov Plan signed by Vladimir Putin.
Is sending the Russian rockets and artilleries the Lovrov's plan to threaten the Azerbaijani government to accept the occupation of the Azerbaijani Karabakh by the Russian troops under the fake title of the peacekeeping forces?
The Four resolutions of the United Nations (4 decisions) meant the full withdrawal of the Armenian troops from Karabakh and the 7 surrounding regions.
The 4 resolutions of the United Nations didn't mean the real occupant of Karabakh of Azrebaijan to change its mask of wars and enters as the peacekeeping troops (Russian peacekeeping troops!!!)
Russia never wants "PEACE", rather wants to piece the countries into "PIECES".
Russia settled the Armenians gron the Ottoman Empire and Iran and settled in the Soth Caucasus and then created Armenia in the territory of Azerbaijan since 1828 until today.
Russia is the real colonial power.
Russia always has delivered many wapons to Armenia (free). Russia has trained the Armenian soldiers.
Billions of dollars of the sophisticated weapons and the military technologies havw been delivered to Armenia ( mostly very cheap or free). For example:
The Iskandar missiles, the SS-300 defense system and etc.
Russia delivers all these weapons very cheap or free to a very poor country like Armenia (free!) to make this country? Why?
To fight the Russian proxy wars against Azerbaijan.
Russia, illegally, has occupied Karabakh (since 10 Nov 2020) and plays the role of the peakeepers in the occupied Azerbaijani Karabakh.
Russia is self the occupant in Karabakh.
The Lovrov Plan is a plan for raping. It is a plan for raping of the 4 resolutions of the United Nations to witdrawal of the occupying troops from the Azerbaijani Karabakh.
The illegal deployment of the Russian troops to the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan to occupy this region again but this time by Russia itself not its armenian subjects. The aim of Russia is to make the future tensions and wars possible.
The occupstion of the Karabakh was planned earlier by Sergei Kalantarian (Sergei Lovrov whose father Viktor was an Armenian). This plan has a name: "THE LOVROV'S PLAN".
On OCT 07, 2020, the Turkish news agency Daily Sabah "dailysabah.com" published a news entitled "Russia does not haveobligation to defend Armenia in a war outside its territories, Putin says"
Source:
Russia
does
not
have
obligation
to
defend
Armenia
in
a
war
outside
its
territories,
Putin
says
The Daily Sabah reports:
"Russia does not have an obligation to defend Armenia, as its conflict with Azerbaijan is not being waged in Armenian territory, Russian President Vladimir Putin said Wednesday."
"Speaking in an interview with the Russian public broadcaster," writes the Daily Sabah, "Putin also reiterated his call for a cease-fire, adding that the events were a tragedy and that Moscow was none-the-less deeply concerned."
Source:
Russia
does
not
have
obligation
to
defend
Armenia
in
a
war
outside
its
territories,
Putin
says
Link:
November 12,
2020
(Michael
Young)
:Playing
Great
Games
in
the
South
Caucasus
Russia occupies the region of Karabakh in Azerbaijan and also occupies Abkhazia and South Ossetia of the Republic Georgia, all regions are in the South Caucasus.
Russia
Occupies
Trans-Dniester
In
Moldova
Russia occupies a region in Moldova and Moldova's new president Maia Sandu has called for the withdrawal of Russian troops from a breakaway region at the border with Ukraine.
In her first news conference as president-elect, Ms Sandu said Russian forces never had permission to be in the separatist area of Trans-Dniester.
The Kremlin has rejected her comments, saying the move could be destabilising.
Source:
30 November
2020 (BBC):
Moldova's
new
president
calls
for
Russian
troops
to
withdraw
from
territory
Ms Sandu defeated incumbent president Igor Dodon, who was openly backed by Russia, in a vote earlier this month.
Responding to Ms Sandu's comments, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters in Moscow that Russia expected the authorities stationed in Trans-Dniester to remain in place.
"Russia performs a very important function," he said, adding that any change "could lead to serious destabilisation" in the region.
The separatist region of Trans-Dniester - a narrow strip of land between the Dniester river and the Ukrainian border whose main city is Tiraspol - broke away from Moldova after a brief war in 1992.
The 48-year-old is a former World Bank economist who favours closer ties with the European Union.
On Monday, she said Russia's peacekeeping force - the Operational Group of Russian Forces in Trans-Dniester (OGRF) - should be replaced in the Moldovan territory by civilian monitors under the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
"We are an independent country that does not want foreign troops to stay on its territory," she told reporters in the Moldovan capital, Chisinau.
"This is not just a declaration - this is a necessity," she added, stating that she would "work with Russia for as long as it takes to solve the issue of the arms re
Moldova regards the OGRF as the descendants of the Russian forces that sided with Russian-speaking separatists after the break-up of the Soviet Union.
Russia has about 1,500 troops stationed in the region.
The United Nations has backed a number of resolutions calling on Russian troops to withdraw "unconditionally" from the territory, along with the weapons stockpile they are guarding there.
Responding to Ms Sandu's comments, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters in Moscow that Russia expected the authorities stationed in Trans-Dniester to remain in place.
"Russia performs a very important function," he said, adding that any change "could lead to serious destabilisation" in the region.
The separatist region of Trans-Dniester - a narrow strip of land between the Dniester river and the Ukrainian border whose main city is Tiraspol - broke away from Moldova after a brief war in 1992.
The international community does not recognise its self-declared statehood, and the de-facto government, which remains in a tense stand-off with Moldova, is economically, politically and militarily supported by Russia.
Ms Sandu, a former prime minister of Moldova, scored an emphatic victory against Mr Dodon, who Russian President Vladimir Putin had openly supported in Moldova's presidential election, in a run-off ballot on 15 November.
She has said that as president she would make it her priority to tackle corruption and unite the country. Ms Sandu is due to be sworn in as president in the coming weeks.
Source:
30 November
2020 (BBC):
Moldova's
new
president
calls
for
Russian
troops
to
withdraw
from
territory
On Jan 22, 2019, CNBC "cnbc.com" published a report entitled "Russia is still occupying 20% of our country, Georgia's prime minister says" written by Holly Ellyatt.
Source:
Russia
is
still
occupying
20%
of
our
country,
Georgia's
prime
minister
says
Holly Ellyatt writes:
"Russia's territorial conflict with Ukraine has grabbed much more media attention in recent years but the country's presence in, and support of, breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia continues to plague the Georgia."
"Unfortunately, Russia continues to occupy 20 percent of our territory," Prime Minister Mamuka Bakhtadze told CNBC."
The author addresses:
"Russia's annexation of Crimea from Ukraine and its role in a pro-Russian uprising in 2014 caused international uproar and sanctions to be placed on Russia, but it wasn't the first time that Russia has supported uprisings in neighboring ex-Soviet republics."
The writer explains, "In 2008, Russia supported the self-proclaimed republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (disputed regions since the break up of the Soviet Union) prompting a short-lived, five-day war between Russia and Georgia that resulted in a Russian-led military victory."
Source:
Russia
is
still
occupying
20%
of
our
country,
Georgia's
prime
minister
says
On Nov 17, 2020, the Euroasia Net "eurasianet.org" published an article in the website of entitled "Perspectives | Did Russia win the Karabakh war?" written by Laurence Broers.
Source:
Perspectives | Did Russia win the Karabakh war?
Laurence Broers addresses:
"Moscow added Azerbaijan to the list of states where it has boots on the ground in the South Caucasus, shut out the West, put Turkey in its place and made plain that it remains the dominant."
The October issue of Irish Times (Updated: Fri, Oct 16, 2020) published its report about Karabakh entitled "Azerbaijan rejects Russian call for peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh" written by Daniel McLaughlin.
Source:
Azerbaijan
rejects
Russian
call
for
peacekeepers
in
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Daniel McLaughlin writes:
"Azerbaijan has rejected a Russian suggestion to send peacekeepers or military observers to Nagorno-Karabakh and insisted that its conflict with Armenia over the disputed region can only be resolved with the involvement of Turkey."
The author addresses, "Hundreds of people have been killed in renewed fighting in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, a region of Azerbaijan that has been run by its ethnic Armenian majority since a war in the 1990s that claimed about 30,000."
On Dec. 1, 2020 (Updated Dec. 15, 2020), the New York Times published an article entitled "In Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Deal, Putin Applied a Deft New
Touch" written by Anton Troianovski and Carlotta Gall.
Source:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Peace
Deal,
Putin
Applied
a
Deft
New
Touch
Anton Troianovski and Carlotta Gall write in the New York Times the following words:
"The strategy seems to have paid immediate dividends, providing the Kremlin with a military foothold in the region and welding Armenia firmly into Russia’s sphere of influence, without alienating Azerbaijan."
The authors write:
"With Russian support, Armenia had won control of Nagorno-Karabakh, a region of Azerbaijan inhabited by ethnic Armenians, after a yearslong war in the early 1990s that was precipitated by the breakup of the Soviet Union."
"Armenian forces also captured surrounding districts, expelling more than half a million Azerbaijanis."
Source:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Peace
Deal,
Putin
Applied
a
Deft
New
Touch
On November 20, 2020, the Washington Post "washingtonpost.com" published a news report entitled "In Nagorno-Karabakh peace deal, Russia’s Putin claims a strategic win. But risks are attached" written by Robyn Dixon.
Source:
November 20,
2020:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
peace
deal,
Russia’s
Putin
claims
a
strategic
win.
But
risks
are
attached
Anton Troianovski and Carlotta Gall
in their writing in New York Times address:
"In early November, Azerbaijani troops wrested the mountaintop citadel of Shusha from Armenian control, scaling the wooded slopes and fighting hand-to-hand in close combat through the streets."
The writers explain:
"By Nov. 9, they were pummeling Armenian soldiers along the road to nearby Stepanakert, home to a peacetime population of some 50,000 ethnic Armenians, and an even bigger battle appeared imminent."
Source:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Peace
Deal,
Putin
Applied
a
Deft
New
Touch
Troianovski and Gall write:
"Then Mr. Putin, who earlier had tried to broker a cease-fire, stepped in."
"Azerbaijan that night accidentally shot down a Russian helicopter, potentially giving Moscow a reason to intervene."
Source:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Peace
Deal,
Putin
Applied
a
Deft
New
Touch
PUTIN'S
ULTIMTUM
TO
AZERBAIJAN
The authors write:
The Russian president delivered an ultimatum to Mr. Aliyev of Azerbaijan, according to several people briefed on the matter in the country’s capital, Baku:
"If Azerbaijan did not cease its operations after capturing Shusha, the Russian military would intervene."
The authors explain:
"The same night, a missile of unknown provenance hit an open area in Baku, without causing any injuries, according to Azerbaijani sources.
Some suspected it was a signal from Russia that it was prepared to get involved and had the capacity to inflict significant damage."
The authors address:
"Hours later, Mr. Putin announced a peace deal, and Mr. Aliyev went on television to announce that all military operations would stop."
Anton Troianovski and Carlotta Gall write:
"Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan of Armenia said he had no choice but to go along, facing the prospect of even more bloodshed on the battlefield."
Source:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Peace
Deal,
Putin
Applied
a
Deft
New
Touch
Putin's
Victory?
Troanovski and Gall address:
"Mr. Aliyev cast the deal as a victory, with all but a sliver of what was Armenian-controlled territory in Nagorno-Karabakh being returned to Azerbaijan."
The authors write:
But he, too, had to compromise: Nearly 2,000 Russian troops, operating as peacekeepers, would now be stationed on Azerbaijani territory."
Source:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Peace
Deal,
Putin
Applied
a
Deft
New
Touch
The writers address:
"It was a strategic boon for Russia, giving Moscow a military foothold just north of Iran, but also a risk because it put Russian troops in the middle of one of the world’s most intractable ethnic coflicts."
The authors quote Azad Isazade, who served in Azerbaijan’s Defense Ministry during the 1990s as saying:
"I don’t know how it will end this time, because there is no good example of Russian peacekeepers in the Caucasus.”
"I am worried how it will end," adds Isadzade.
Source:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Peace
Deal,
Putin
Applied
a
Deft
New
Touch
Anton Troianovsky and Carotta Gall write:
"Seared in almost every Azerbaijani’s memory are the bloody events of 1990, when Soviet tanks rolled over demonstrators in Baku’s central square."
"Russian troops have since intervened repeatedly in troubled corners of the Caucasus, often under the moniker of peacekeepers but acting more like an invading army."
Source:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Peace
Deal,
Putin
Applied
a
Deft
New
Touch
WHY
STATUS
TO
ARMENIANS?
Are the Armenians who are living in the Glendale region of Los Angeles in California enjoying for having a political status and a kind of independency from the USA?
Are the districts in Paris, Moscow, Isfahan where the Armenians are residing enjoying the political status?
Why the Western countries and Russian insist to give the political status to the Armenians living in a region of Azerbaijan called Nagorno-Karabakh?
Why not giving a political status to the Armenians living in the Azerbaijani Karabakh is a blow to the self-governing institutions but not for the Armenians living in France, Russuia, USA? Why?
Why not giving the political status and the independency to the Armenians in the Azerbaijani Karabakh creates
uncertainties and insecurities for its Armenian population but not to the Armenians living in France, Syria,Iran, USA, Russia, Canada?
Russia's
Passports
In
The
Occupied
Territories
30 Dec 2020
On 13 November 2020, the website "112.international" published a report entitled "Russia speeds up forceful issuance of passports in Donbas, - Ukraine's military intel".
The information in the website "112.international" addresses:
"Russia speeds up forceful issuance of passports in Donbas, - Ukraine's military intel."
"Besides, the Russian side recruits men with Russian citizenship who reside in Donbas for service in the ranks of peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh."
According to this information in the website "112.international":
"Russian passport, i.e. citizenship is the obligatory condition for citizens to serve in the units of the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the occupant troops."
The website's information addresses:
"Russian military command pays special attention to the process of issuance of passports to the recruited servicemen."
Source:
Russia
speeds
up
forceful
issuance
of
passports
in Donbas,
-
Ukraine's
military
intel
"Besides, the Russian side recruits men with Russian citizenship who reside in Donbas for service in the ranks of peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh."
Russian occupant forces continue to hasten forceful issuance of passports for residents of the occupied Donbas. Press office of the Chief Intelligence Department of Ukraine's Defense Ministry "reported that on November 13, 2020.
The website "112.international" addresses:
"Russian passport, i.e. citizenship is the obligatory condition for citizens to serve in the units of the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the occupant troops."
The website's information says:
"Russian military command pays special attention to the process of issuance of passports to the recruited servicemen."
According to the informstion of the website "112.international":
"Besides, the Ukrainian intelligence reported that Russian side recruits men with Russian citizenship who reside in Donbas for service in the ranks of peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh."
The website "112.international" informs:
"The occupants also consider cutting civilian rights for people holding the passport of Ukraine."
The website's infornation explains:
"The changes may include status of "foreign citizen", disapproval of electoral right and the opportunity to make civilian and legal deals, which require notary certification."
On 22 June 2019 Holly Elyatt writes:
"In 2008, Russia supported the self-proclaimed republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (disputed regions since the break up of the Soviet Union) prompting a short-lived, five-day war between Russia and Georgia that resulted in a Russian-led military victory."
Source:
Russia
is
still
occupying
20%
of
our
country,
Georgia's
prime
minister
says
On October 20, 2020 the Carnegie Endowment's website "carnegieendowment.org" published an article entitled "Russia’s Stony Path in the South Caucasus" written by Philip Remler.
Source:
Oct. 20,
2020
(Philip
Remler)
Russia’s
Stony
Path
in
the
South
Caucasus
Philip Remler writes:
"Russian president Boris Yeltsin called Shevardnadze in November 1999 to demand the reinstatement of Russian border troops in Georgia and passage for Russian military units through Georgia to attack Pankisi from the south."
The author adds, "Shevardnadze stalled and then called on the Americans to dissuade Yeltsin."
The author addresses, "Later, after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States sent troops to train the Georgians to restore security in Pankisi, forestalling Russian actions there."
Mr. Remler writes:
"Even worse, from the Russian point of view, Shevardnadze made a deal with Ruslan Gelayev, a Chechen commander sheltering in the Pankisi Gorge, to launch an attack on Abkhaz-held territory in 2001."
"The attack failed, but the Russian authorities viewed this series of events as proof that Georgia was treacherous and untrustworthy."
Philip Remel writes, "With Russian facilitation, many so-called volunteers made their way to Abkhazia to join the separatist war against Georgia from 1992 to 1993."
"Among the most effective of these was the Chechen Shamil Basayev, who was later an archnemesis of the Russians but their ally in that struggle."11*
*11 “Georgia/Abkhazia: Violations of the Laws of War and Russia’s Role in the Conflict,” Human Rights Watch, March 1995, https://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Georgia2.htm.
Source:
Oct. 20,
2020
(Philip
Remler)
Russia’s
Stony
Path
in
the
South
Caucasus
The author writes:
"Since brokering a ceasefire in the Karabakh conflict in 1994, Moscow has limited its interventions to trying (unsuccessfully) to get the sides to agree to a Russia-led peacekeeping force of the sort Moscow installed to control the Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdniestria separatist conflicts."
Philip Remler addresses:
"Despite initial nationalist difficulties in Borchaly, an Azerbaijani-inhabited section of Georgia, Georgian-Azerbaijani relations have been good almost since Georgia’s independence—largely thanks to a reconciliation of convenience between two Soviet-era rivals, Eduard Shevardnadze and Heydar Aliyev."
The author addresses, "Georgian-Armenian relations have been trickier. A portion of the Armenian population in Georgia is concentrated in Javakheti, near a large Soviet (later Russian) military base that fueled the region’s economy until it was closed in 2007. From 1992 to 1993, the Javakhk Armenians sought independence, apparently with Russian encouragement."
Sergey Lovrov was talking about the peacekeeping mission while Mr. Lpvrov's Russia used earler (1988-1993) its armenian subjects to make a proxy war against Azerbaijan and by so doing, the imperialist Russia and its armeninans occupied more than 20 percent of the territories of Azerbaijan.
Source:
November 20,
2020:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
peace
deal,
Russia’s
Putin
claims
a
strategic
win.
But
risks
are
attached
Robyn Dixon writes:
"The Russian military presence reinforces the Kremlin’s view that its sphere of influence includes Azerbaijan and Armenia, both former Soviet countries."
Dixon adds, "It also is another counterweight to geopolitical rival, Turkey, a close Azerbaijan ally and key customer for its Caspian Sea oil and gas."
The author addresses, " Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh war proved decisive, but Putin managed to block Turkey’s ambitions to send its own peacekeepers to Nagorno-Karabakh."
"Turkey will instead send peacekeepers to Azerbaijan to take part in a monitoring center jointly with Russia."
Source:
November 20,
2020:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
peace
deal,
Russia’s
Putin
claims
a
strategic
win.
But
risks
are
attached
Robyn Dixon notes, "What Russia did was codify victories on the ground,” said Michael McFaul, director of Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies."
The author quotes Michael McFaul, director of Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies as saying:
“Whether you like it or not, this agreement is a real diplomatic victory for Vladimir Putin and allows him to play the role of peacemaker.”
"It’s the reassertion of what Putin and the folks around him have dreamed about for 20 years of being the regional hegemon," adds McFaul.
Michael McFaul continues:
The writer talks about Laurence Broers, expert on the Caucasus region at London-based think tank Chatham House, who is referring to Putin’s sparse nine-point agreement."
Source:
November 20,
2020:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
peace
deal,
Russia’s
Putin
claims
a
strategic
win.
But
risks
are
attached
Laurence Broers addressez:
"The issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, the original issue that is contested between the sides, isn’t even mentioned in the document."
Broers adds:
"So it’s not really a basis for a long-term resolution of the conflict."
"It’s more like a kind of holding pattern.”
Robyn Dixon explains:
"Nagorno-Karabakh’s security relies solely on the presence of Russian peacekeepers, but remains precarious since Azerbaijan can veto their presence after five years." (Armenia also has a veto right.)
Source:
November 20,
2020:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
peace
deal,
Russia’s
Putin
claims
a
strategic
win.
But
risks
are
attached
Mr. Dixon writes:
"Russian state TV conveyed the message that its peacekeepers were heroically coming to the rescue of Karabakh’s ethnic Armenians."
The author notes:
"But it also sent a chilling message about Armenia’s Velvet Revolution of 2018, which propelled Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to power."
"Pashinyan removed several pro-Moscow security chiefs," writes the author, "and tried to balance Russia’s influence by fostering closer ties with Europe."
Source:
November 20,
2020:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
peace
deal,
Russia’s
Putin
claims
a
strategic
win.
But
risks
are
attached
Russian President Vladimir V. Putin confess repeatedly that the Nagorno Karabakh territory [according to the international law and based on the documents exist in the United Nations] is the inseparable Azerbaijani territory."
Russia never keeps its words. Vladimir Putin between Sept 27, 2020 to Nov. 9, 2020 the appropriate time for the intervention of his Russian troops in the Nagorno Karabakh region of Azerbaijan.
Vladimir Putin, Sergei Lovrov and the defense minister Sergei Shoigo evaluated how to fish more colonial benefits from the war in the Azetbaijani territory.
The strstegic interst of the imperial and colonial Russia was determined on Nov 9, 2020.
Putin, Lovrov and Shoigo wanted to implement their long time planned blueprint for sending of the Russian troops to the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan.
Vladimir Putin, after threatening of the president of Azerbaijan and giving an ultimatum, decided to demonstrate the seriousness of his ultimatum to Azerbaijan. He ordered to his military officers to fire several Russian rockets to the capital of Azerbain.
Vladimir Putin forced the Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to accept the Russian decision for the occupation of Karabakh by the Russian troops.
Vladimir Putin himself together with his foreign minister Sergei Lovrov (his real name Sergei Kalantarian and he is ethnucally an Armenian) and the defence minister Sergei Shoygo send the Russian troops with the fake title of "The Russian Peacekeeping Troops" to occupy the region of Karabakh in Azerbaijan!!!
"Giving an Ultimatum to Azerbaijan on 9 Nov 2020 (at night) and then targeting the capital of Azerbaijan with millions of people when they are at homes (at night) by several Russia rockets and artilleries were the integral part of the Lovrov Plan signed by Vladimir Putin.
Is sending the Russian rockets and artilleries the Lovrov's plan to threaten the Azerbaijani government to accept the occupation of the Azerbaijani Karabakh by the Russian troops under the fake title of the peacekeeping forces?
The Four resolutions of the United Nations (4 decisions) meant the full withdrawal of the Armenian troops from Karabakh and the 7 surrounding regions.
The 4 resolutions of the United Nations didn't mean the real occupant of Karabakh of Azrebaijan to change its mask of wars and enters as the peacekeeping troops (Russian peacekeeping troops!!!)
Russia never wants "PEACE", rather wants to piece the countries into "PIECES".
Russia settled the Armenians gron the Ottoman Empire and Iran and settled in the Soth Caucasus and then created Armenia in the territory of Azerbaijan since 1828 until today.
Russia is the real colonial power.
Russia always has delivered many wapons to Armenia (free). Russia has trained the Armenian soldiers.
Billions of dollars of the sophisticated weapons and the military technologies havw been delivered to Armenia ( mostly very cheap or free). For example:
The Iskandar missiles, the SS-300 defense system and etc.
Russia delivers all these weapons very cheap or free to a very poor country like Armenia (free!) to make this country? Why?
To fight the Russian proxy wars against Azerbaijan.
Russia, illegally, has occupied Karabakh (since 10 Nov 2020) and plays the role of the peakeepers in the occupied Azerbaijani Karabakh.
Russia is self the occupant in Karabakh.
The Lovrov Plan is a plan for raping. It is a plan for raping of the 4 resolutions of the United Nations to witdrawal of the occupying troops from the Azerbaijani Karabakh.
The illegal deployment of the Russian troops to the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan to occupy this region again but this time by Russia itself not its armenian subjects. The aim of Russia is to make the future tensions and wars possible.
The occupstion of the Karabakh was planned earlier by Sergei Kalantarian (Sergei Lovrov whose father Viktor was an Armenian). This plan has a name: "THE LOVROV'S PLAN".
On OCT 07, 2020, the Turkish news agency Daily Sabah "dailysabah.com" published a news entitled "Russia does not haveobligation to defend Armenia in a war outside its territories, Putin says"
Source:
Russia
does
not
have
obligation
to
defend
Armenia
in
a
war
outside
its
territories,
Putin
says
The Daily Sabah reports:
"Russia does not have an obligation to defend Armenia, as its conflict with Azerbaijan is not being waged in Armenian territory, Russian President Vladimir Putin said Wednesday."
Source:
Russia
does
not
have
obligation
to
defend
Armenia
in
a
war
outside
its
territories,
Putin
says
Link:
November 12,
2020
(Michael
Young)
:Playing
Great
Games
in
the
South
Caucasus
Russia
Occupies
Trans-Dniester
In
Moldova
Source:
30 November
2020 (BBC):
Moldova's
new
president
calls
for
Russian
troops
to
withdraw
from
territory
Source:
30 November
2020 (BBC):
Moldova's
new
president
calls
for
Russian
troops
to
withdraw
from
territory
Source:
Russia
is
still
occupying
20%
of
our
country,
Georgia's
prime
minister
says
Source:
Russia
is
still
occupying
20%
of
our
country,
Georgia's
prime
minister
says
Source:
Perspectives | Did Russia win the Karabakh war?
Source:
Azerbaijan
rejects
Russian
call
for
peacekeepers
in
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Source:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Peace
Deal,
Putin
Applied
a
Deft
New
Touch
Source:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Peace
Deal,
Putin
Applied
a
Deft
New
Touch
"Speaking in an interview with the Russian public broadcaster," writes the Daily Sabah, "Putin also reiterated his call for a cease-fire, adding that the events were a tragedy and that Moscow was none-the-less deeply concerned."
Source:
Russia
does
not
have
obligation
to
defend
Armenia
in
a
war
outside
its
territories,
Putin
says
Link:
November 12,
2020
(Michael
Young)
:Playing
Great
Games
in
the
South
Caucasus
Russia occupies the region of Karabakh in Azerbaijan and also occupies Abkhazia and South Ossetia of the Republic Georgia, all regions are in the South Caucasus.
Russia occupies a region in Moldova and Moldova's new president Maia Sandu has called for the withdrawal of Russian troops from a breakaway region at the border with Ukraine.
In her first news conference as president-elect, Ms Sandu said Russian forces never had permission to be in the separatist area of Trans-Dniester.
The Kremlin has rejected her comments, saying the move could be destabilising.
Source:
30 November
2020 (BBC):
Moldova's
new
president
calls
for
Russian
troops
to
withdraw
from
territory
Ms Sandu defeated incumbent president Igor Dodon, who was openly backed by Russia, in a vote earlier this month.
Responding to Ms Sandu's comments, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters in Moscow that Russia expected the authorities stationed in Trans-Dniester to remain in place.
"Russia performs a very important function," he said, adding that any change "could lead to serious destabilisation" in the region.
The separatist region of Trans-Dniester - a narrow strip of land between the Dniester river and the Ukrainian border whose main city is Tiraspol - broke away from Moldova after a brief war in 1992.
The 48-year-old is a former World Bank economist who favours closer ties with the European Union.
On Monday, she said Russia's peacekeeping force - the Operational Group of Russian Forces in Trans-Dniester (OGRF) - should be replaced in the Moldovan territory by civilian monitors under the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
"We are an independent country that does not want foreign troops to stay on its territory," she told reporters in the Moldovan capital, Chisinau.
"This is not just a declaration - this is a necessity," she added, stating that she would "work with Russia for as long as it takes to solve the issue of the arms re
Moldova regards the OGRF as the descendants of the Russian forces that sided with Russian-speaking separatists after the break-up of the Soviet Union.
Russia has about 1,500 troops stationed in the region.
The United Nations has backed a number of resolutions calling on Russian troops to withdraw "unconditionally" from the territory, along with the weapons stockpile they are guarding there.
Responding to Ms Sandu's comments, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters in Moscow that Russia expected the authorities stationed in Trans-Dniester to remain in place.
"Russia performs a very important function," he said, adding that any change "could lead to serious destabilisation" in the region.
The separatist region of Trans-Dniester - a narrow strip of land between the Dniester river and the Ukrainian border whose main city is Tiraspol - broke away from Moldova after a brief war in 1992.
The international community does not recognise its self-declared statehood, and the de-facto government, which remains in a tense stand-off with Moldova, is economically, politically and militarily supported by Russia.
Ms Sandu, a former prime minister of Moldova, scored an emphatic victory against Mr Dodon, who Russian President Vladimir Putin had openly supported in Moldova's presidential election, in a run-off ballot on 15 November.
She has said that as president she would make it her priority to tackle corruption and unite the country. Ms Sandu is due to be sworn in as president in the coming weeks.
Source:
30 November
2020 (BBC):
Moldova's
new
president
calls
for
Russian
troops
to
withdraw
from
territory
On Jan 22, 2019, CNBC "cnbc.com" published a report entitled "Russia is still occupying 20% of our country, Georgia's prime minister says" written by Holly Ellyatt.
Source:
Russia
is
still
occupying
20%
of
our
country,
Georgia's
prime
minister
says
Holly Ellyatt writes:
"Russia's territorial conflict with Ukraine has grabbed much more media attention in recent years but the country's presence in, and support of, breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia continues to plague the Georgia."
"Unfortunately, Russia continues to occupy 20 percent of our territory," Prime Minister Mamuka Bakhtadze told CNBC."
The author addresses:
"Russia's annexation of Crimea from Ukraine and its role in a pro-Russian uprising in 2014 caused international uproar and sanctions to be placed on Russia, but it wasn't the first time that Russia has supported uprisings in neighboring ex-Soviet republics."
The writer explains, "In 2008, Russia supported the self-proclaimed republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (disputed regions since the break up of the Soviet Union) prompting a short-lived, five-day war between Russia and Georgia that resulted in a Russian-led military victory."
Source:
Russia
is
still
occupying
20%
of
our
country,
Georgia's
prime
minister
says
On Nov 17, 2020, the Euroasia Net "eurasianet.org" published an article in the website of entitled "Perspectives | Did Russia win the Karabakh war?" written by Laurence Broers.
Source:
Perspectives | Did Russia win the Karabakh war?
Laurence Broers addresses:
"Moscow added Azerbaijan to the list of states where it has boots on the ground in the South Caucasus, shut out the West, put Turkey in its place and made plain that it remains the dominant."
The October issue of Irish Times (Updated: Fri, Oct 16, 2020) published its report about Karabakh entitled "Azerbaijan rejects Russian call for peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh" written by Daniel McLaughlin.
Source:
Azerbaijan
rejects
Russian
call
for
peacekeepers
in
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Daniel McLaughlin writes:
"Azerbaijan has rejected a Russian suggestion to send peacekeepers or military observers to Nagorno-Karabakh and insisted that its conflict with Armenia over the disputed region can only be resolved with the involvement of Turkey."
The author addresses, "Hundreds of people have been killed in renewed fighting in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, a region of Azerbaijan that has been run by its ethnic Armenian majority since a war in the 1990s that claimed about 30,000."
On Dec. 1, 2020 (Updated Dec. 15, 2020), the New York Times published an article entitled "In Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Deal, Putin Applied a Deft New
Touch" written by Anton Troianovski and Carlotta Gall.
Source:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Peace
Deal,
Putin
Applied
a
Deft
New
Touch
Anton Troianovski and Carlotta Gall write in the New York Times the following words:
"The strategy seems to have paid immediate dividends, providing the Kremlin with a military foothold in the region and welding Armenia firmly into Russia’s sphere of influence, without alienating Azerbaijan."
The authors write:
"With Russian support, Armenia had won control of Nagorno-Karabakh, a region of Azerbaijan inhabited by ethnic Armenians, after a yearslong war in the early 1990s that was precipitated by the breakup of the Soviet Union."
"Armenian forces also captured surrounding districts, expelling more than half a million Azerbaijanis."
Source:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Peace
Deal,
Putin
Applied
a
Deft
New
Touch
On November 20, 2020, the Washington Post "washingtonpost.com" published a news report entitled "In Nagorno-Karabakh peace deal, Russia’s Putin claims a strategic win. But risks are attached" written by Robyn Dixon.
Source:
November 20,
2020:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
peace
deal,
Russia’s
Putin
claims
a
strategic
win.
But
risks
are
attached
Source:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Peace
Deal,
Putin
Applied
a
Deft
New
Touch
Source:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Peace
Deal,
Putin
Applied
a
Deft
New
Touch
PUTIN'S
ULTIMTUM
TO
AZERBAIJAN
Source:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Peace
Deal,
Putin
Applied
a
Deft
New
Touch
Putin's
Victory?
Source:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Peace
Deal,
Putin
Applied
a
Deft
New
Touch
Source:
November 20,
2020:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
peace
deal,
Russia’s
Putin
claims
a
strategic
win.
But
risks
are
attached
Anton Troianovski and Carlotta Gall
in their writing in New York Times address:
"In early November, Azerbaijani troops wrested the mountaintop citadel of Shusha from Armenian control, scaling the wooded slopes and fighting hand-to-hand in close combat through the streets."
The writers explain:
"By Nov. 9, they were pummeling Armenian soldiers along the road to nearby Stepanakert, home to a peacetime population of some 50,000 ethnic Armenians, and an even bigger battle appeared imminent."
Source:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Peace
Deal,
Putin
Applied
a
Deft
New
Touch
Troianovski and Gall write:
"Then Mr. Putin, who earlier had tried to broker a cease-fire, stepped in."
"Azerbaijan that night accidentally shot down a Russian helicopter, potentially giving Moscow a reason to intervene."
Source:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Peace
Deal,
Putin
Applied
a
Deft
New
Touch
The authors write:
The Russian president delivered an ultimatum to Mr. Aliyev of Azerbaijan, according to several people briefed on the matter in the country’s capital, Baku:
"If Azerbaijan did not cease its operations after capturing Shusha, the Russian military would intervene."
The authors explain:
"The same night, a missile of unknown provenance hit an open area in Baku, without causing any injuries, according to Azerbaijani sources.
Some suspected it was a signal from Russia that it was prepared to get involved and had the capacity to inflict significant damage."
The authors address:
"Hours later, Mr. Putin announced a peace deal, and Mr. Aliyev went on television to announce that all military operations would stop."
Anton Troianovski and Carlotta Gall write:
"Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan of Armenia said he had no choice but to go along, facing the prospect of even more bloodshed on the battlefield."
Source:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Peace
Deal,
Putin
Applied
a
Deft
New
Touch
Troanovski and Gall address:
"Mr. Aliyev cast the deal as a victory, with all but a sliver of what was Armenian-controlled territory in Nagorno-Karabakh being returned to Azerbaijan."
The authors write:
But he, too, had to compromise: Nearly 2,000 Russian troops, operating as peacekeepers, would now be stationed on Azerbaijani territory."
Source:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Peace
Deal,
Putin
Applied
a
Deft
New
Touch
The writers address:
"It was a strategic boon for Russia, giving Moscow a military foothold just north of Iran, but also a risk because it put Russian troops in the middle of one of the world’s most intractable ethnic coflicts."
Source:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Peace
Deal,
Putin
Applied
a
Deft
New
Touch
Source:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Peace
Deal,
Putin
Applied
a
Deft
New
Touch
WHY
STATUS
TO
ARMENIANS?
The authors quote Azad Isazade, who served in Azerbaijan’s Defense Ministry during the 1990s as saying:
"I don’t know how it will end this time, because there is no good example of Russian peacekeepers in the Caucasus.”
"I am worried how it will end," adds Isadzade.
Source:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Peace
Deal,
Putin
Applied
a
Deft
New
Touch
Anton Troianovsky and Carotta Gall write:
"Seared in almost every Azerbaijani’s memory are the bloody events of 1990, when Soviet tanks rolled over demonstrators in Baku’s central square."
"Russian troops have since intervened repeatedly in troubled corners of the Caucasus, often under the moniker of peacekeepers but acting more like an invading army."
Source:
In
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Peace
Deal,
Putin
Applied
a
Deft
New
Touch
Are the Armenians who are living in the Glendale region of Los Angeles in California enjoying for having a political status and a kind of independency from the USA?
Are the districts in Paris, Moscow, Isfahan where the Armenians are residing enjoying the political status?
Why the Western countries and Russian insist to give the political status to the Armenians living in a region of Azerbaijan called Nagorno-Karabakh?
Why not giving a political status to the Armenians living in the Azerbaijani Karabakh is a blow to the self-governing institutions but not for the Armenians living in France, Russuia, USA? Why?
Why not giving the political status and the independency to the Armenians in the Azerbaijani Karabakh creates
uncertainties and insecurities for its Armenian population but not to the Armenians living in France, Syria,Iran, USA, Russia, Canada?
Russia's
Passports
In
The
Occupied
Territories
30 Dec 2020
On 13 November 2020, the website "112.international" published a report entitled "Russia speeds up forceful issuance of passports in Donbas, - Ukraine's military intel".
The information in the website "112.international" addresses:
"Russia speeds up forceful issuance of passports in Donbas, - Ukraine's military intel."
"Besides, the Russian side recruits men with Russian citizenship who reside in Donbas for service in the ranks of peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh."
According to this information in the website "112.international":
"Russian passport, i.e. citizenship is the obligatory condition for citizens to serve in the units of the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the occupant troops."
The website's information addresses:
"Russian military command pays special attention to the process of issuance of passports to the recruited servicemen."
Source:
Russia
speeds
up
forceful
issuance
of
passports
in Donbas,
-
Ukraine's
military
intel
"Besides, the Russian side recruits men with Russian citizenship who reside in Donbas for service in the ranks of peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh."
Russian occupant forces continue to hasten forceful issuance of passports for residents of the occupied Donbas. Press office of the Chief Intelligence Department of Ukraine's Defense Ministry "reported that on November 13, 2020.
The website "112.international" addresses:
"Russian passport, i.e. citizenship is the obligatory condition for citizens to serve in the units of the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the occupant troops."
The website's information says:
"Russian military command pays special attention to the process of issuance of passports to the recruited servicemen."
According to the informstion of the website "112.international":
"Besides, the Ukrainian intelligence reported that Russian side recruits men with Russian citizenship who reside in Donbas for service in the ranks of peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh."
The website "112.international" informs:
"The occupants also consider cutting civilian rights for people holding the passport of Ukraine."
The website's infornation explains:
"The changes may include status of "foreign citizen", disapproval of electoral right and the opportunity to make civilian and legal deals, which require notary certification."
On 22 June 2019 Holly Elyatt writes:
"In 2008, Russia supported the self-proclaimed republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (disputed regions since the break up of the Soviet Union) prompting a short-lived, five-day war between Russia and Georgia that resulted in a Russian-led military victory."
Source:
Russia
is
still
occupying
20%
of
our
country,
Georgia's
prime
minister
says
On October 20, 2020 the Carnegie Endowment's website "carnegieendowment.org" published an article entitled "Russia’s Stony Path in the South Caucasus" written by Philip Remler.
Source:
Oct. 20,
2020
(Philip
Remler)
Russia’s
Stony
Path
in
the
South
Caucasus
Philip Remler writes:
"Russian president Boris Yeltsin called Shevardnadze in November 1999 to demand the reinstatement of Russian border troops in Georgia and passage for Russian military units through Georgia to attack Pankisi from the south."
The author adds, "Shevardnadze stalled and then called on the Americans to dissuade Yeltsin."
The author addresses, "Later, after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States sent troops to train the Georgians to restore security in Pankisi, forestalling Russian actions there."
Mr. Remler writes:
"Even worse, from the Russian point of view, Shevardnadze made a deal with Ruslan Gelayev, a Chechen commander sheltering in the Pankisi Gorge, to launch an attack on Abkhaz-held territory in 2001."
"The attack failed, but the Russian authorities viewed this series of events as proof that Georgia was treacherous and untrustworthy."
Philip Remel writes, "With Russian facilitation, many so-called volunteers made their way to Abkhazia to join the separatist war against Georgia from 1992 to 1993."
"Among the most effective of these was the Chechen Shamil Basayev, who was later an archnemesis of the Russians but their ally in that struggle."11*
*11 “Georgia/Abkhazia: Violations of the Laws of War and Russia’s Role in the Conflict,” Human Rights Watch, March 1995, https://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Georgia2.htm.
Source:
Oct. 20,
2020
(Philip
Remler)
Russia’s
Stony
Path
in
the
South
Caucasus
The author writes:
"Since brokering a ceasefire in the Karabakh conflict in 1994, Moscow has limited its interventions to trying (unsuccessfully) to get the sides to agree to a Russia-led peacekeeping force of the sort Moscow installed to control the Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdniestria separatist conflicts."
Philip Remler addresses:
"Despite initial nationalist difficulties in Borchaly, an Azerbaijani-inhabited section of Georgia, Georgian-Azerbaijani relations have been good almost since Georgia’s independence—largely thanks to a reconciliation of convenience between two Soviet-era rivals, Eduard Shevardnadze and Heydar Aliyev."
The author addresses, "Georgian-Armenian relations have been trickier. A portion of the Armenian population in Georgia is concentrated in Javakheti, near a large Soviet (later Russian) military base that fueled the region’s economy until it was closed in 2007. From 1992 to 1993, the Javakhk Armenians sought independence, apparently with Russian encouragement."
Russian occupant forces continue to hasten forceful issuance of passports for residents of the occupied Donbas. Press office of the Chief Intelligence Department of Ukraine's Defense Ministry "reported that on November 13, 2020.
